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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpf: Home Assistant MCP Server: YAML config backups written under www/ are served unauthenticated at /local/

MediumCVSS 6.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone on the same network segment can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: ha-mcp (PyPI) 7.5.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to ha-mcp (PyPI) 7.5.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary When `ENABLE_YAML_CONFIG_EDITING=true`, every `ha_config_set_yaml` call backs up the pre-edit file to `<config>/www/yaml_backups/`, which Home Assistant serves at `/local/` with **no authentication**. Anyone who can reach the HA web interface can download the most recent pre-edit `configuration.yaml` (or other YAML file) — typically containing plaintext MQTT passwords, REST credentials, webhook IDs, geofence coordinates, and `shell_command` definitions — with zero credentials. ### Details The backup feature is good — `do_backup` defaults to `True` and protects users from a bad edit. The issue is the location: - `custom_components/ha_mcp_tools/__init__.py:596` — `backup_dir = config_dir / "www" / "yaml_backups"` - `custom_components/ha_mcp_tools/__init__.py:602` — `backup_file = backup_dir / f"{safe_name}.{timestamp}.bak"` - `custom_components/ha_mcp_tools/__init__.py:606-607,692-693` — backup path returned to caller and logged at INFO `<config>/www/` is `/local/` and HA serves it unauthenticated by design (intended for static dashboard assets). An attacker discovers the path three ways: (1) it's returned to the MCP client in `result["backup_path"]`; (2) it's logged at INFO and recoverable via `ha_get_logs`; (3) the timestamp format is `%Y%m%d_%H%M%S` — 86,400 candidates per day, enumerable. Backups accumulate (no rotation), so a long-running install holds a chronological history. **Preconditions:** `ENABLE_YAML_CONFIG_EDITING=true` (off by default), at least one YAML edit made, and the attacker can reach HA's port 8123 (LAN, or internet via Nabu Casa / reverse proxy). ### PoC A pytest E2E test against a fresh Docker HA container with the custom component installed (using the project's existing `ha_container_with_fresh_config` fixture): ``` [1] ha_config_set_yaml(yaml_path="template", action="add", ...) → success=True [1] backup_path = 'www/yaml_backups/configuration.yaml.20260505_171335.bak' [2] GET http://<ha>:8123/local/yaml_backups/configuration.yaml.20260505_171335.bak (no Authorization header) [2] HTTP 200, 440 bytes — the full pre-edit configuration.yaml [control] GET /api/config without auth → HTTP 401 ``` The control proves the result is meaningful: the same instance returns 401 for an authenticated endpoint; only `/local/` is unauthenticated by HA design. ### Impact CWE-552 (Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties). Affects users with `ENABLE_YAML_CONFIG_EDITING=true` who have made at least one YAML edit. Anyone who can reach HA port 8123 reads the most recent pre-edit config without credentials. CVSS 6.5 medium (`AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`); 7.5 high if HA is internet-exposed. ### Resolution Fixed in `7.4.1.dev456` (PR #1180). The fix relocates new backups to `<config>/.ha_mcp_tools_backups/` (config root, not served by `/local/`) and adds a one-time migration on integration setup that moves any pre-existing exposed backups, surfaces a persistent notification telling the user to rotate exposed secrets, and removes the legacy directory if empty. The fix ships in the next biweekly stable release and is available immediately on the dev channel. Updating to a release containing the fix is sufficient — no manual action required for users who upgrade. ### Manual cleanup (for users who cannot upgrade yet) If you used `ha_config_set_yaml` on a vulnerable version and cannot wait for the next stable release, manually remove the exposed backups: ``` rm -rf <config>/www/yaml_backups/ ``` Then rotate any secrets that may have been in the YAML files those backups captured (MQTT/REST credentials, webhook IDs, `shell_command` definitions, geofence coordinates). The directory is reachable at `http(s)://<ha-host>:8123/local/yaml_backups/` until removed. After the next addon/package upgrade containing the fix, the integration will run this cleanup automatically and surface a persistent notification with the same rotation guidance.

Published
May 14, 2026
Updated
May 14, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

26

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
PyPIha-mcp

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIha-mcpbefore 7.5.07.5.0

Same product

PyPI: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-q855-8rh5-jfgqha-mcp: Add-on settings and policy routes are reachable without authentication at the bare root path
    26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:ha-mcp7.5.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
none
Availability
none
Attack vector
Adjacent
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv

References

All records