Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-pcgw-qcv5-h8ch: Unsigned SAML LogoutRequest Acceptance in gosaml2

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 (Go) 0.11.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 (Go) 0.11.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The `ValidateEncodedLogoutRequestPOST` function in gosaml2 accepts completely unsigned SAML `LogoutRequest` messages even when `SkipSignatureValidation` is set to `false`. When `validateElementSignature` returns `dsig.ErrMissingSignature`, the code in `decode_logout_request.go:60-62` silently falls through to process the unverified XML element instead of rejecting it. An attacker who can reach the SP's Single Logout endpoint can forge a `LogoutRequest` for any user, terminating their session without possessing the IdP's signing key. ## Affected Version - **Library**: `github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2` - **Version**: All versions up to and including the latest commit on `main` (as of 2026-03-16) - **File**: `decode_logout_request.go`, lines 58-69 ## Vulnerable Code ```go // decode_logout_request.go:57-69 var requestSignatureValidated bool if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation { el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el) if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature { // Unfortunately we just blew away our Response el = doc.Root() // <-- BUG: falls through with unsigned element } else if err != nil { return nil, err } else if el == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout request") } else { requestSignatureValidated = true } } ``` When `ErrMissingSignature` is returned, the code resets `el` to the raw document root and continues. The `requestSignatureValidated` variable remains `false`, but no error is returned. The unsigned `LogoutRequest` is unmarshalled and passed to `ValidateDecodedLogoutRequest`, which performs attribute/issuer checks but does **not** verify that a signature was present. ## Attack Details | Property | Value | |---|---| | **Attack vector** | Network (HTTP POST to SLO endpoint) | | **Authentication required** | None | | **Payload size** | ~450 bytes (unsigned XML) | | **User interaction** | None | | **Complexity** | Low -- only requires knowledge of the SP's SLO URL and IdP issuer | | **CVSS estimate** | 7.5 (High) -- Network/Low/None/None, Availability impact | ## Impact - **Arbitrary session termination**: An attacker can force-logout any user by forging a `LogoutRequest` with the victim's `NameID`. This is a targeted denial-of-service. - **Business disruption**: Critical users (executives, admins, operators) can be repeatedly logged out, disrupting access to the application during incidents or time-sensitive operations. - **Security control bypass**: If session termination triggers downstream effects (e.g., revoking tokens, clearing caches), an attacker can weaponize this to force re-authentication flows and potentially intercept them. - **No cryptographic material needed**: The attacker does not need the IdP's private key. The forged request contains zero cryptographic elements. ## Suggested Fix When `ErrMissingSignature` is returned and `SkipSignatureValidation` is `false`, the function should return an error instead of falling through: ```go // decode_logout_request.go -- fixed version var requestSignatureValidated bool if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation { el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el) if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature { // FIXED: reject unsigned requests when signature validation is required return nil, fmt.Errorf("logout request is not signed: %w", dsig.ErrMissingSignature) } else if err != nil { return nil, err } else if el == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout request") } else { requestSignatureValidated = true } } ``` This ensures that unsigned `LogoutRequest` messages are rejected when `SkipSignatureValidation` is `false`, matching the behavior that operators expect when they configure signature enforcement. Attached lab [f1_unsigned_logout.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26038319/f1_unsigned_logout.zip)

Published
Mar 18, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-pcgw-qcv5-h8ch

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools
Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2before 0.11.00.11.0

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-4760CBC Padding Panic — Unauthenticated Process Crash in github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2
    0Monitor
  • GO-2026-4764Unsigned SAML LogoutRequest Acceptance in gosaml2 in github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2gosaml2 CBC Padding Panic — Unauthenticated Process Crash
    0Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/russellhaering/gosaml20.11.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records