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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2: gosaml2 CBC Padding Panic — Unauthenticated Process Crash

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 (Go) 0.11.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 (Go) 0.11.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The AES-CBC decryption path in `DecryptBytes()` panics on crafted ciphertext whose plaintext is all zero bytes. After decryption, `bytes.TrimRight(data, "\x00")` empties the slice, then `data[len(data)-1]` panics with `index out of range [-1]`. There is no `recover()` in the library. The panic propagates through `ValidateEncodedResponse` and kills the goroutine (or the entire process in non-`net/http` servers). An attacker needs only the SP's public RSA key (published in SAML metadata) to construct the payload — no valid signature is required. ## Affected Version All versions of `github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2` through latest (`v0.9.0` and HEAD) that support AES-CBC encrypted assertions. ## Vulnerable Code **`types/encrypted_assertion.go:65-79`** — `DecryptBytes`, AES-CBC branch: ```go case MethodAES128CBC, MethodAES256CBC, MethodTripleDESCBC: if len(data)%k.BlockSize() != 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypted data is not a multiple of the expected CBC block size %d: actual size %d", k.BlockSize(), len(data)) } nonce, data := data[:k.BlockSize()], data[k.BlockSize():] c := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(k, nonce) c.CryptBlocks(data, data) // Remove zero bytes data = bytes.TrimRight(data, "\x00") // <-- empties the slice if plaintext is all zeros // Calculate index to remove based on padding padLength := data[len(data)-1] // <-- PANIC: index out of range [-1] lastGoodIndex := len(data) - int(padLength) return data[:lastGoodIndex], nil ``` ## Attack Details | Property | Value | |---|---| | **Attack Vector** | Network (unauthenticated HTTP POST to ACS endpoint) | | **Authentication Required** | None | | **Attacker Knowledge** | SP's public RSA certificate (published in SAML metadata) | | **Signature Required** | No — decryption happens before assertion signature validation | | **Payload Size** | Single HTTP POST (~2 KB) | | **Repeatability** | Unlimited — attacker can send the payload repeatedly | | **Affected Configurations** | Any SP with `SPKeyStore` configured (encrypted assertion support) | | **Trigger Condition** | AES-CBC plaintext that is all `0x00` bytes after decryption | ## Impact - **Process crash**: In gRPC servers, custom frameworks, CLI tools, and background workers, the unrecovered panic kills the entire OS process immediately. - **Goroutine crash**: In `net/http` servers, the built-in per-goroutine recovery catches the panic, returning HTTP 500 and logging the full stack trace. The server survives but the request-handling goroutine is terminated abnormally. - **Denial of service**: The attack is unauthenticated and repeatable. A single crafted HTTP request is sufficient. Automated retries can keep the service down indefinitely. - **No valid signature needed**: The SAML Response does not need to be signed. On the unsigned-response code path (`decode_response.go:346`), `decryptAssertions()` is called **before** any assertion signature validation. ## Reproduction ### Prerequisites - Docker (for the vulnerable server) - Python 3.8+ with `cryptography` and `requests` packages ### Files | File | Description | |---|---| | `server.go` | Minimal SAML SP using gosaml2 — the victim | | `poc.py` | Attacker script — builds and sends the crafted payload | | `Dockerfile` | Multi-stage build for the vulnerable server | | `run.sh` | Build and orchestration script | ### Steps ```bash # 1. Build the vulnerable server ./run.sh build # 2. Start the server ./run.sh start # 3. Run the attacker script pip install cryptography requests ./run.sh attack # Or do everything in one command: ./run.sh all ``` ### Expected Output **Attacker terminal (`poc.py`):** ``` ======================================================== CVE: CBC Padding Panic — Unauthenticated Process Crash Target: gosaml2 (github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2) File: types/encrypted_assertion.go:77 Impact: Remote DoS — single HTTP request kills process ======================================================== [*] Target: http://localhost:9999 [*] Checking server health... [+] Server is alive ======================================================== Phase 1: Obtain SP public certificate from metadata ======================================================== [*] GET http://localhost:9999/metadata [+] Retrieved SP certificate (xxx bytes) ======================================================== Phase 2: Build crafted EncryptedAssertion payload ======================================================== [+] Extracted RSA public key (size=2048 bits) [*] Generated AES-128 key: <hex> [+] RSA-OAEP encrypted AES key (256 bytes) [+] AES-128-CBC ciphertext: IV(<hex>) + 16 bytes [*] Plaintext is all zeros — will trigger empty-slice panic after TrimRight [+] Built SAML Response (xxx bytes XML, xxx bytes b64) ======================================================== Phase 3: Send payload to /acs ======================================================== [*] POST http://localhost:9999/acs [*] The server will decrypt our ciphertext, hit the all-zero plaintext edge case, and panic in DecryptBytes()... [*] Got HTTP 500 — goroutine panicked but net/http recovered it ======================================================== Phase 4: Verify server status ======================================================== [*] Server is still responding (net/http recovered the goroutine panic) [*] But the panic stack trace in server logs confirms the vulnerability. [*] In non-HTTP servers, the process would be dead. ======================================================== VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED types/encrypted_assertion.go:77 — index out of range [-1] Stack trace: types/encrypted_assertion.go:77 (padLength := data[len(data)-1]) decode_response.go:176 (decryptAssertions) decode_response.go:346 (ValidateEncodedResponse) ======================================================== ``` **Server logs (panic stack trace):** ``` http: panic serving 127.0.0.1:xxxxx: runtime error: index out of range [-1] goroutine XX [running]: net/http.(*conn).serve.func1() /usr/local/go/src/net/http/server.go:1898 +0xbe github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/types.(*EncryptedAssertion).DecryptBytes(...) types/encrypted_assertion.go:77 +0x... github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2.(*SAMLServiceProvider).decryptAssertions.func1(...) decode_response.go:176 +0x... github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2.(*SAMLServiceProvider).decryptAssertions(...) decode_response.go:196 +0x... github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2.(*SAMLServiceProvider).ValidateEncodedResponse(...) decode_response.go:346 +0x... ``` ## Suggested Fix Replace the unsafe zero-byte trimming and unchecked index with proper PKCS#7 unpadding and bounds checks: ```go case MethodAES128CBC, MethodAES256CBC, MethodTripleDESCBC: if len(data)%k.BlockSize() != 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("ciphertext not multiple of block size") } nonce, data := data[:k.BlockSize()], data[k.BlockSize():] c := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(k, nonce) c.CryptBlocks(data, data) // Validate decrypted data is non-empty if len(data) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypted data is empty") } // Proper PKCS#7 unpadding with bounds checks padLength := int(data[len(data)-1]) if padLength < 1 || padLength > k.BlockSize() || padLength > len(data) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid padding length: %d", padLength) } // Verify all padding bytes are consistent for i := len(data) - padLength; i < len(data); i++ { if data[i] != byte(padLength) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid PKCS#7 padding") } } return data[:len(data)-padLength], nil ``` Key changes: 1. **Remove `bytes.TrimRight(data, "\x00")`** entirely — it corrupts valid PKCS#7-padded data and creates the empty-slice condition. 2. **Bounds-check `padLength`** before using it as a slice index. 3. **Validate all padding bytes** match (proper PKCS#7 verification). 4. **Return errors** instead of panicking on malformed input.

Published
Mar 18, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2before 0.11.00.11.0

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-pcgw-qcv5-h8chUnsigned SAML LogoutRequest Acceptance in gosaml2
    30Monitor
  • GO-2026-4760CBC Padding Panic — Unauthenticated Process Crash in github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2
    0Monitor
  • GO-2026-4764Unsigned SAML LogoutRequest Acceptance in gosaml2 in github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2
    0Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/russellhaering/gosaml20.11.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

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Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Attack context

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