CVE-2026-99223: keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.18% (FIRST EPSS).
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 13fc051269d670810d9e314061b61c6dd06116a0, 61ac0585d9f4344d3dfb84b5edff1fee7d532897, 8451d4a4c43127c3b9fdf9fc9ff3fea5539a61f9.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 13fc051269d670810d9e314061b61c6dd06116a0, 61ac0585d9f4344d3dfb84b5edff1fee7d532897, 8451d4a4c43127c3b9fdf9fc9ff3fea5539a61f9 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array traversal order. The first word of the index is a public, deterministic hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description. An unprivileged user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address. On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to distinguish the candidate slides. Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word. Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and the description with a once-initialized SipHash key. Use the full IDs in the later index chunks as well. Truncating or hashing the IDs there would lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a differing index bit. Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered. Cache them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered. Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent, and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search. The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged; only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced.
- Published
- Nov 2, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 3, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 7th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 3.13affected
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before 9ebe824d55983c9f063a2c9ef1a08b29812d406faffected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before e108b22999edbc6f431466baf6b2016c19b7ed31affected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before 9f084ef0beb68091e96ab96f0e95579aac8a77f9affected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before 8451d4a4c43127c3b9fdf9fc9ff3fea5539a61f9affected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before 13fc051269d670810d9e314061b61c6dd06116a0affected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before 61ac0585d9f4344d3dfb84b5edff1fee7d532897affected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before 84f7c699f8d139f743c7dc11ef41d085690955bbaffected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before a113eba06bd1183c614d7994864d6e7054140cb9affected · git
- b2a4df200d570b2c33a57e1ebfa5896e4bc81b69 and later · before de891c73c1cf41ac8de12c07fa2c84d6a912ad0caffected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | from 0 | — |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.115-1 | 6.12.115-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-99221Nov 2, 2026 · keys/trusted_keys: return immediately after TPM unseal failure0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-99222Nov 2, 2026 · keys: Protect the read method check against type removal0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-99224Nov 2, 2026 · keys: Protect the type name while describing a key28Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 13fc051269d670810d9e314061b61c6dd06116a0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 61ac0585d9f4344d3dfb84b5edff1fee7d532897 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 8451d4a4c43127c3b9fdf9fc9ff3fea5539a61f9 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 84f7c699f8d139f743c7dc11ef41d085690955bb | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 9ebe824d55983c9f063a2c9ef1a08b29812d406f | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 9f084ef0beb68091e96ab96f0e95579aac8a77f9 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | a113eba06bd1183c614d7994864d6e7054140cb9 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | de891c73c1cf41ac8de12c07fa2c84d6a912ad0c | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | e108b22999edbc6f431466baf6b2016c19b7ed31 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.115-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 5, 2026+3 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
- Exploit maturity— → none
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (8 more)Show less
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/61ac0585d9f4344d3dfb84b5edff1fee7d532897
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/8451d4a4c43127c3b9fdf9fc9ff3fea5539a61f9
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/84f7c699f8d139f743c7dc11ef41d085690955bb
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ebe824d55983c9f063a2c9ef1a08b29812d406f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f084ef0beb68091e96ab96f0e95579aac8a77f9
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/a113eba06bd1183c614d7994864d6e7054140cb9
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/de891c73c1cf41ac8de12c07fa2c84d6a912ad0c
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e108b22999edbc6f431466baf6b2016c19b7ed31
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.