CVE-2026-99033: net/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt()
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.18% (FIRST EPSS).
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 00fbf71e74115f7628fc0880b855434b1e70c40c, 28bc1ef699610ee09ce3d46a00552f5a0a0144bd, 31c7b15b3716e8d0dad58d2c3cdf321dfd06f4be; azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 Release Notes; azl3 kernel 6.6.159.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.161.1-1.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 00fbf71e74115f7628fc0880b855434b1e70c40c, 28bc1ef699610ee09ce3d46a00552f5a0a0144bd, 31c7b15b3716e8d0dad58d2c3cdf321dfd06f4be; azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 Release Notes; azl3 kernel 6.6.159.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.161.1-1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt() packet_rcv_spkt() restores the link layer header with skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb)); That subtraction is only meaningful when the device actually has a link layer header. packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() both wrap it in dev_has_header(), which is also the predicate the block comment at the top of the file states the restore in terms of; packet_rcv_spkt() does not. commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices without visible hard header") introduced the helper and changed the two call sites, and this one stayed behind. A device without a visible ll header can leave skb->mac_header at the 0xFFFF sentinel that __alloc_skb() initialises it to. A CAN skb does: init_can_skb() sets pkt_type and ip_summed but does not reset the headers, and commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb headroom infrastructure") dropped the skb_reset_*_header() calls that used to be there. skb_mac_header() is then 0xFFFF, the length becomes a large negative number and skb_push() reports it through skb_under_panic() -- from softirq context, so it is a full system panic even with panic_on_oops=0: skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8bd21bc1 len:-65455 put:-65471 head:... data:... tail:0x50 end:0x180 dev:can0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x50/0x60 Call Trace: <IRQ> skb_push+0x38/0x40 packet_rcv_spkt+0xe1/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x7e8/0xd30 ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The socket type is reachable: packet_create() accepts SOCK_PACKET alongside SOCK_RAW and SOCK_DGRAM behind the same CAP_NET_RAW check, and neither the socket length nor a capability check keeps it away from a CAN interface. The missing skb_reset_*_header() calls in init_can_skb() are a regression in their own right and are being fixed separately, but a packet socket should not turn a link layer that did not initialise its mac header into a kernel panic. Guard the push the way the other two receive paths do. Tested on v7.3-rc5 under QEMU with a slcan device on a pty, which is the driver RX path: vcan does not reproduce it, because can_send() resets the headers on the way out. One SOCK_PACKET socket bound to can0 and one frame written into the line discipline panics an unpatched kernel with the trace above; the same image with this patch prints no panic and powers off normally. Both kernels are this tree, defconfig plus CONFIG_CAN_SLCAN=y, differing only in this hunk.
- Published
- Oct 23, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 30, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 8th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- dadddde259a19105ee69e788835f4d4552767aa9, 5.10affected
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before 48aa1155fa8d83362fc33d02d527a3c3fe40ce1caffected · git
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before 7f84ed94ccfe36091234a2891b88356dc06e6d66affected · git
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before b880df0e487caa85c3c7ffda37dcd05334b1aa80affected · git
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before d8a24b9e1774a93943caf68d48c5e17be432220baffected · git
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before 31c7b15b3716e8d0dad58d2c3cdf321dfd06f4beaffected · git
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before 3efe0e0944157fdd2072b4dc7eb0491a317ed272affected · git
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before 00fbf71e74115f7628fc0880b855434b1e70c40caffected · git
- d549699048b4b5c22dd710455bcdb76966e55aa3 and later · before 28bc1ef699610ee09ce3d46a00552f5a0a0144bdaffected · git
- 5.9.13 and later · before 5.10affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | from 0 | — |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.113-1 | 6.12.113-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.11-1 | 7.2.11-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-99031Oct 23, 2026 · net: bridge: avoid recursive multicast port cleanup0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-99032Oct 23, 2026 · net/smc: protect clcsock lifetime in smc_getname31Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-99034Oct 23, 2026 · mmc: sdhci-sprd: disable runtime PM on remove0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 00fbf71e74115f7628fc0880b855434b1e70c40c | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 28bc1ef699610ee09ce3d46a00552f5a0a0144bd | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 31c7b15b3716e8d0dad58d2c3cdf321dfd06f4be | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 3efe0e0944157fdd2072b4dc7eb0491a317ed272 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 48aa1155fa8d83362fc33d02d527a3c3fe40ce1c | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 5.10 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 7f84ed94ccfe36091234a2891b88356dc06e6d66 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | b880df0e487caa85c3c7ffda37dcd05334b1aa80 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | d8a24b9e1774a93943caf68d48c5e17be432220b | Vendor (CNA) |
| azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | Release Notes | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| azl3 kernel 6.6.159.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | 6.6.161.1-1 · Release Notes | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.113-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 8, 2026+16 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1390 · Oct 26, 2026(Linux Kernel Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (7 more)Show less
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/28bc1ef699610ee09ce3d46a00552f5a0a0144bd
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/31c7b15b3716e8d0dad58d2c3cdf321dfd06f4be
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/3efe0e0944157fdd2072b4dc7eb0491a317ed272
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/48aa1155fa8d83362fc33d02d527a3c3fe40ce1c
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f84ed94ccfe36091234a2891b88356dc06e6d66
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b880df0e487caa85c3c7ffda37dcd05334b1aa80
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8a24b9e1774a93943caf68d48c5e17be432220b
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.