CVE-2026-98845: tpm: Disable TPM on null key name mismatch
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.15% (FIRST EPSS).
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 015fb29a748342a186f37b602ac70017098c8251, 6.12, 96c46c75b0d470b4204f9fe1bdb075cd2ebaebfa.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 015fb29a748342a186f37b602ac70017098c8251, 6.12, 96c46c75b0d470b4204f9fe1bdb075cd2ebaebfa or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: Disable TPM on null key name mismatch The null key name check exists to protect against TPM reset attacks, so a mismatch should stop the device from serving further requests. Currently it does not disable the chip when it finds a mismatch. The mismatch is logged: tpm tpm0: null key integrity check failed but the chip keeps serving commands: / # tpm2_getcap -c properties-fixed TPM_PT_FAMILY_INDICATOR: as UINT32: 0x08322e3000 as string: "2.0" ... tpm2_load_null() where the null key name check is run sets the chip as disabled only if the rc is non zero. When the mismatch is seen, rc is zero at that point and it returns success. The other issue is that the caller expects the null key handle to be populated when the function returns 0 which it does here without writing the handle and proceeds assuming the null key handle is valid. During the test, I noticed that tpm2_start_auth_session() uses the uninitialized stack value as the key handle since tpm2_load_null() returns 0 despite the integrity failure and proceeds with TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS with this value as salt key handle. Set rc to -ENODEV on the mismatch. The error path then disables the chip and returns the correct code to the caller. Tested in QEMU with swtpm and CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC=y by making TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD fail with TPM2_RC_INTEGRITY and changing the name of the re-created null key. The chip is now disabled on the mismatch.
- Published
- Oct 18, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 4th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 294984ce51c19c2af3d0d71e1c8bd589bc86b8e2, 386c7cc6c06d64cbf36d15c5e2319814765e107c, 6.12affected
- cc7d8594342a25693d40fe96f97e5c6c29ee609c and later · before a03d0c64cd827a622578623a78defd66b6593b82affected · git
- cc7d8594342a25693d40fe96f97e5c6c29ee609c and later · before 96c46c75b0d470b4204f9fe1bdb075cd2ebaebfaaffected · git
- cc7d8594342a25693d40fe96f97e5c6c29ee609c and later · before f6599d8830fe7ddab7334cc17846fd9ac9a7fa50affected · git
- cc7d8594342a25693d40fe96f97e5c6c29ee609c and later · before 015fb29a748342a186f37b602ac70017098c8251affected · git
- 6.11.7 and later · before 6.12affected · semver
- 6.11.10 and later · before 6.12affected · semver
- before 6.12not affected · semver
- 6.12.113 and later · up to and including 6.12.*not affected · semver
- 6.18.56 and later · up to and including 6.18.*not affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux-6.12 | before 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 | 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.113-1 | 6.12.113-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.10-1 | 7.2.10-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98843Oct 18, 2026 · netfs: zero gaps in read-gaps folio to avoid writing back stale data0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98844Oct 18, 2026 · netfs: clear post-EOF pagecache when extending a file via write0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-98846Oct 18, 2026 · sctp: check RCV_SHUTDOWN after the sendmsg connect wait0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 015fb29a748342a186f37b602ac70017098c8251 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 6.12 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 96c46c75b0d470b4204f9fe1bdb075cd2ebaebfa | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | a03d0c64cd827a622578623a78defd66b6593b82 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | f6599d8830fe7ddab7334cc17846fd9ac9a7fa50 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.113-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux-6.12 | 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 7, 2026+19 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.