CVE-2026-98395: powerpc/entry: Fix irq_soft_mask corruption on replayed interrupt exit
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.18% (FIRST EPSS).
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 63a7531ca31f9f097d9cc1cc3fe86ae683cdabdd, 95cd316a896f1c1aa4ee4a817ba3d4691103c81b.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 63a7531ca31f9f097d9cc1cc3fe86ae683cdabdd, 95cd316a896f1c1aa4ee4a817ba3d4691103c81b or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/entry: Fix irq_soft_mask corruption on replayed interrupt exit When __replay_soft_interrupts() replays a pending interrupt (e.g. PACA_IRQ_DEC -> timer_interrupt), it calls the handler directly with a synthetic pt_regs. The DEFINE_INTERRUPT_HANDLER_ASYNC wrapper around each handler calls arch_interrupt_async_exit_prepare() on the way out, which calls arch_interrupt_exit_prepare() -> local_irq_disable() -> arch_local_irq_disable(), which does: irq_soft_mask_set(IRQS_DISABLED) /* 0x1 */ This unconditionally overwrites irq_soft_mask with IRQS_DISABLED (0x1), stripping the IRQS_PMI_DISABLED (0x2) bit. The result is that irq_soft_mask is 0x1 instead of IRQS_ALL_DISABLED (0x3) when the handler returns to __replay_soft_interrupts(). For a normally-taken interrupt this is harmless: the next interrupt always enters through arch_interrupt_enter_prepare() which unconditionally sets irq_soft_mask to IRQS_ALL_DISABLED. But during replay, next_interrupt() is called directly between replayed handlers without going back through arch_interrupt_enter_prepare(), so the stripped bit is never restored. next_interrupt() then fires a WARNING: WARNING: arch/powerpc/kernel/irq_64.c:75 WARN_ON(irq_soft_mask_return() != IRQS_ALL_DISABLED) The warning was observed early in boot on a POWER10 pseries guest during kmem_cache_init_late(), where a spinlock release triggers interrupt replay that processes a pending timer interrupt. Debugger state confirming the bug: Before timer_interrupt(®s): irq_soft_mask = 0x3 (IRQS_ALL_DISABLED) correct irq_happened = 0x41 (HARD_DIS|REPLAYING) correct After timer_interrupt(®s) returns: irq_soft_mask = 0x1 (IRQS_DISABLED) WRONG - PMI bit stripped irq_happened = 0x41 unchanged The fix is to replace local_irq_disable() with hard_irq_disable(). hard_irq_disable() is the right primitive here for two reasons: 1. On PPC64 (hw_irq.h:301) it calls irq_soft_mask_set_return(IRQS_ALL_DISABLED), setting the soft mask to 0x3 (both IRQS_DISABLED and IRQS_PMI_DISABLED), which preserves the PMI bit and fixes the WARNING. The additional work it does (__hard_irq_disable(), PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS |=) is redundant but safe since both are already set at this point in the exit path; the trace_hardirqs_off() inside is guarded by if (!arch_irqs_disabled_flags(flags)) so it will not double-fire. 2. On PPC32 (hw_irq.h:467) hard_irq_disable() maps to arch_local_irq_disable() -> __hard_irq_disable(), which clears MSR[EE] in hardware. This is exactly correct: PPC32 has no soft-mask PACA mechanism, so the hardware disable is the right way to satisfy irqentry_exit()'s requirement. This also fixes a build error on PPC32 where irq_soft_mask_set() is only defined under CONFIG_PPC64: arch/powerpc/include/asm/entry-common.h:273: error: implicit declaration of function 'irq_soft_mask_set' Using hard_irq_disable() requires no #ifdef and is consistent with how the rest of the entry code (e.g. entry-common.h:463) handles the same PPC32/PPC64 split.
- Published
- Oct 14, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 8th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
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We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 7.2affected
- 334f3f6d7a1660fd65597bad9960bfa33a716d35 and later · before 95cd316a896f1c1aa4ee4a817ba3d4691103c81baffected · git
- 334f3f6d7a1660fd65597bad9960bfa33a716d35 and later · before 63a7531ca31f9f097d9cc1cc3fe86ae683cdabddaffected · git
- before 7.2not affected · semver
- 7.2.7 and later · up to and including 7.2.*not affected · semver
- 7.3 and laternot affected · original_commit_for_fix
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.7-1 | 7.2.7-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98393Oct 14, 2026 · net: ipv4: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98394Oct 14, 2026 · af_unix: Return immediately when manage_oob() returns NULL for 0-length buffer.0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-98396Oct 14, 2026 · powerpc: Do not restore KUAP in arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare()0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 63a7531ca31f9f097d9cc1cc3fe86ae683cdabdd | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 95cd316a896f1c1aa4ee4a817ba3d4691103c81b | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 7.2.7-1 · Debian:14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 11, 2026+28 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1334 · Oct 15, 2026(Linux Kernel Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.