drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 31/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.15% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0, 3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8, 6.19.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0, 3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8, 6.19 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU walk on swapout failure") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under "if (!ret)", so the ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink() infinite LRU walk on backup failure") tests "lret > 0", which is what was intended here as well. Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO's bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable. When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move (ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()), ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its !ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos->first / pos->last is left pointing at freed memory. The next ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(), "list_del corruption" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL dereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a hibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel Ainsworth's analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the dangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it dangles. Testing the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD Phoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on a 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug crashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one hibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the removal happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles were clean.
- Published
- Oct 6, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 4th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
31
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · Linux
- 7.8
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 060f8f3020516d71bc4d6159d4d0beef85606a74, 0124a09e3e5f5f6080efe9663b27af27933f8382, 7.1affected
- b2ed01e7ad3de80333e9b962a44024b094bc0b2b and later · before 1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0affected · git
- b2ed01e7ad3de80333e9b962a44024b094bc0b2b and later · before 3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8affected · git
- 6.18.57 and later · before 6.19affected · semver
- 7.0.10 and later · before 7.1affected · semver
- before 7.1not affected · semver
- 7.2.8 and later · up to and including 7.2.*not affected · semver
- 7.3 and laternot affected · original_commit_for_fix
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.8-1 | 7.2.8-1 |
| openSUSE:Tumbleweed | kernel-source | before 7.2.10-1.1 | 7.2.10-1.1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98147Sep 25, 2026 · printk: Don't WARN on kthread_run failure.0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98148Sep 25, 2026 · drm/gud: validate GUD_ROTATION_0 is present in supported rotations0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-98167Oct 6, 2026 · smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 6.19 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 7.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 7.2.8-1 · Debian:14 | Package registry (OSV) |
| opensuse:kernel-source | 7.2.10-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayOct 25, 2026+19 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- CVSS— → 7.8
- Severity— → high
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.