CVE-2026-97945: x86/mm: Fix user-space data loss with MADV_FREE and THP
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.20% (FIRST EPSS).
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 55ddbc2ca6d5db64d44c3fb8f8705b4d39eb30b7, a5ad97cbcfcec31430268441c10eedde73200177, b5dec6dfb593d81fec15ba43c4fe5d58f10a49a2; azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.158.1-1.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 55ddbc2ca6d5db64d44c3fb8f8705b4d39eb30b7, a5ad97cbcfcec31430268441c10eedde73200177, b5dec6dfb593d81fec15ba43c4fe5d58f10a49a2; azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.158.1-1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Fix user-space data loss with MADV_FREE and THP Some of users of Polars (a data analytics library) have lost production data from this bug. They seem to have just the right combination of huge pages, MADV_FREE and heavy reclaim pressure. pmd_modify() masks the old value with (_HPAGE_CHG_MASK & ~_PAGE_DIRTY), silently discarding the hardware dirty bit. The subsequent pmd_mksaveddirty() call is supposed to transfer _PAGE_DIRTY into _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY when write-protecting, but the dirty bit was already stripped from the value, so there is nothing left to transfer. Contrast with pte_modify(), which keeps _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS in its mask, and pud_modify(), which keeps _HPAGE_CHG_MASK untouched: pmd_modify() is the odd one out. Any pmd_modify() on a writable, dirty PMD loses the dirty state. One visible consequence is data loss with MADV_FREE on PMD-mapped THP: memset(buf, 0x5A, size); // PMD-mapped THP, PMD dirty madvise(buf, size, MADV_FREE); // PMD cleaned but left writable, // folio marked lazyfree memset(buf, 0x5A, size); // hardware sets _PAGE_DIRTY again mprotect(buf, size, PROT_READ); // pmd_modify() drops the dirty bit mprotect(buf, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE); // ... memory pressure ... Reclaim (e.g. under memcg pressure) then finds the lazyfree folio with no dirty bit set anywhere and frees it in __discard_anon_folio_pmd_locked(), even though the data was rewritten after MADV_FREE; subsequent reads fault in fresh zero pages. NUMA hinting alone can trigger the same loss, as do_huge_pmd_numa_page() restores the PMD through pmd_modify() as well. PMD-mapped file THPs are affected too: mprotect()/NUMA hinting dropping the dirty bit means rewritten data is never written back. Fix it by keeping _PAGE_DIRTY in the preserved mask, exactly like pte_modify() and pud_modify() do. The existing pmd_mksaveddirty()/pmd_clear_saveddirty() pair then performs the hardware-dirty <-> saved-dirty transition based on the write bit, preserving the shadow-stack encoding rules.
- Published
- Sep 25, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 10th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 6.6affected
- bb3aadf7d446aaf22c725b274e2c194ac5cb2111 and later · before b5dec6dfb593d81fec15ba43c4fe5d58f10a49a2affected · git
- bb3aadf7d446aaf22c725b274e2c194ac5cb2111 and later · before e4d569fe2f436a9b58c048fefabf56eab68c1b7eaffected · git
- bb3aadf7d446aaf22c725b274e2c194ac5cb2111 and later · before 55ddbc2ca6d5db64d44c3fb8f8705b4d39eb30b7affected · git
- bb3aadf7d446aaf22c725b274e2c194ac5cb2111 and later · before a5ad97cbcfcec31430268441c10eedde73200177affected · git
- bb3aadf7d446aaf22c725b274e2c194ac5cb2111 and later · before f7491d7c81db0e7c304a7bd757a76d2fbeaff80eaffected · git
- before 6.6not affected · semver
- 6.6.158 and later · up to and including 6.6.*not affected · semver
- 6.12.111 and later · up to and including 6.12.*not affected · semver
- 6.18.53 and later · up to and including 6.18.*not affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux-6.12 | before 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.111-1 | 6.12.111-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.7-1 | 7.2.7-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-97943Sep 25, 2026 · x86/mm/pat: Acquire init_mm write lock on collapse to avoid UAF0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-97944Sep 25, 2026 · x86/cfi: Fix FineIBT hash offset in cfi_get_func_hash()0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-97946Sep 25, 2026 · x86/amd_node: Fix PCI device reference counting in amd_smn_init()0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 55ddbc2ca6d5db64d44c3fb8f8705b4d39eb30b7 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | a5ad97cbcfcec31430268441c10eedde73200177 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | b5dec6dfb593d81fec15ba43c4fe5d58f10a49a2 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | e4d569fe2f436a9b58c048fefabf56eab68c1b7e | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | f7491d7c81db0e7c304a7bd757a76d2fbeaff80e | Vendor (CNA) |
| azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | 6.6.158.1-1 · Release Notes | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.111-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux-6.12 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1184 · Sep 28, 2026(Linux Kernel Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.