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NVD / CVE Program· CNA Linux

CVE-2026-93164: uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10

—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.20% (FIRST EPSS).
  • Fixed version: Linux Linux 1b3fecd09910040668b752f3377d7218ca5c59ac, 554ba38456dad8053a1a80afe6ae6da9eff745cc, 7abc9b49ad01a179e893ba137364a560e21b09f8; azl4 kernel 6.18.50-1.5.azl4 on Azure Linux 4.0 0:6.18.57-1.1.azl4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 1b3fecd09910040668b752f3377d7218ca5c59ac, 554ba38456dad8053a1a80afe6ae6da9eff745cc, 7abc9b49ad01a179e893ba137364a560e21b09f8; azl4 kernel 6.18.50-1.5.azl4 on Azure Linux 4.0 0:6.18.57-1.1.azl4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uprobes/x86: Move optimized uprobe from nop5 to nop10 Andrii reported an issue with optimized uprobes [1] that can clobber redzone area with call instruction storing return address on stack where user code may keep temporary data without adjusting rsp. Fixing this by moving the optimized uprobes on top of 10-bytes nop instruction, so we can squeeze another instruction to escape the redzone area before doing the call, like: lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp call tramp Note the lea instruction is used to adjust the rsp register without changing the flags. We use nop10 and following transformation to optimized instructions above and back as suggested by Peterz [2]. Optimize path (int3_update_optimize): 1) Initial state after set_swbp() installed the uprobe: cc 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 From offset 0 this is INT3 followed by the tail of the original 10-byte NOP. After a previous unoptimization bytes 5..9 may still contain the old call instruction, which remains valid for threads already there. 2) Rewrite the LEA tail and call displacement: cc [8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3] From offset 0 this traps on the uprobe INT3. Bytes 1..9 are not executable entry points while byte 0 is trapped. 3) Publish the first LEA byte: [48] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this is: lea -0x80(%rsp), %rsp call <uprobe-trampoline> Unoptimize path (int3_update_unoptimize): 1) Initial optimized state: 48 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 Same as 3) above. 2) Trap new entries before restoring the NOP bytes: [cc] 8d 64 24 80 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this traps. A thread that had already executed the LEA can still reach the intact CALL at offset 5. 3) Restore bytes 1..4 of the original NOP while keeping byte 0 trapped and byte 5 as CALL. cc [2e 0f 1f 84] e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this still traps. Offset 5 is still the CALL for any thread that was already past the first LEA byte. 4) Publish the first byte of the original NOP: [66] 2e 0f 1f 84 e8 d0 d1 d2 d3 From offset 0 this is the restored 10-byte NOP; the CALL opcode and displacement are now only NOP operands. Offset 5 still decodes as CALL for a thread that was already there. Tthere is only a single target uprobe-trampoline for the given nop10 instruction address, so the CALL instruction will not be changed across unoptimization/optimization cycles. Therefore, any task that is preempted at the CALL instruction is guaranteed to observe that CALL and not anything else. Note as explained in [2] we need to use following nop10: PF1 PF2 ESC NOPL MOD SIB DISP32 NOP10: 0x66, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 -- cs nopw 0x00000000(%rax,%rax,1) which means we need to allow 0x2e prefix which maps to INAT_PFX_CS attribute in is_prefix_bad function. Also changing the uprobe syscall error when called out of uprobe trampoline to -EPROTO, so we are able to detect the fixed kernel. The optimized uprobe performance stays the same: uprobe-nop : 3.129 ± 0.013M/s uprobe-push : 3.045 ± 0.006M/s uprobe-ret : 1.095 ± 0.004M/s --> uprobe-nop10 : 7.170 ± 0.020M/s uretprobe-nop : 2.143 ± 0.021M/s uretprobe-push : 2.090 ± 0.000M/s uretprobe-ret : 0.942 ± 0.000M/s --> uretprobe-nop10: 3.381 ± 0.003M/s usdt-nop : 3.245 ± 0.004M/s --> usdt-nop10 : 7.256 ± 0.023M/s [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260509003146.976844-1-andrii@kernel.org/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260518104306.GU3102624@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/#t

Published
Sep 17, 2026
Updated
Oct 19, 2026
EPSS
0.2% · 10th percentile
CWE
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.2%

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Linux Linux

    • 6.18affected
    • ba2bfc97b4629b10bd8d02b36e04f3932a04cac4 and later · before 7abc9b49ad01a179e893ba137364a560e21b09f8affected · git
    • ba2bfc97b4629b10bd8d02b36e04f3932a04cac4 and later · before 1b3fecd09910040668b752f3377d7218ca5c59acaffected · git
    • ba2bfc97b4629b10bd8d02b36e04f3932a04cac4 and later · before 554ba38456dad8053a1a80afe6ae6da9eff745ccaffected · git
    • before 6.18not affected · semver
    • 6.18.57 and later · up to and including 6.18.*not affected · semver
    • 7.2.6 and later · up to and including 7.2.*not affected · semver
    • 7.3 and laternot affected · original_commit_for_fix

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:14linuxbefore 7.2.6-17.2.6-1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

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    40Plan
  • CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment
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  • CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()
    40Plan

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-93162Sep 17, 2026 · crypto: qat - cancel work on re-enable SR-IOV timeout
    0Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-93163Sep 17, 2026 · hwrng: core - fix rng list on registration error
    0Monitor
  • Later →CVE-2026-93165Sep 17, 2026 · platform/chrome: sensorhub: Fix memory overread in ring handler
    30Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Linux Linux1b3fecd09910040668b752f3377d7218ca5c59acVendor (CNA)
Linux Linux554ba38456dad8053a1a80afe6ae6da9eff745ccVendor (CNA)
Linux Linux7abc9b49ad01a179e893ba137364a560e21b09f8Vendor (CNA)
azl4 kernel 6.18.50-1.5.azl4 on Azure Linux 4.00:6.18.57-1.1.azl4 · Release NotesMicrosoft (MSRC)
debian:linux7.2.6-1 · Debian:14Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

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Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

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No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Not on record for this CVE: patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.

Weakness class (CWE)

—

Attack context

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References

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