Skip to content
Noroxi
CVE.org (no NVD analysis yet)· CNA zephyr

CVE-2026-91007: Arbitrary supervisor-mode function pointer injection via charger_set_prop() syscall in the charger driver API

HighCVSS 7.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 31/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: zephyrproject zephyr 4.3.2, 4.5.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to zephyrproject zephyr 4.3.2, 4.5.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org

The user-mode syscall verifiers for the charger driver API in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c did not inspect the prop argument before copying union charger_propval across the user/kernel boundary. Two members of that union are function pointers — status_notification (CHARGER_PROP_STATUS_NOTIFICATION) and online_notification (CHARGER_PROP_ONLINE_NOTIFICATION), declared in include/zephyr/drivers/charger.h — and z_vrfy_charger_set_prop() forwarded the caller-supplied union verbatim to the driver's set_property callback for any property. z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() had the mirror defect and copied the stored kernel callback address back out to user memory. With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, any user-mode thread that has been granted a charger device object could call charger_set_prop() with CHARGER_PROP_STATUS_NOTIFICATION or CHARGER_PROP_ONLINE_NOTIFICATION and an arbitrary pointer value. Drivers that implement these properties — drivers/charger/charger_max20335.c, drivers/charger/charger_pf1550.c and drivers/charger/charger_bq2518x.c — store the pointer in device data and later invoke it from their interrupt work handlers, which run in supervisor mode, on any charger state change such as a cable plug/unplug. The result is a control-flow hijack at kernel privilege from an unprivileged thread, defeating the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide; the read path additionally disclosed a kernel code address to user mode, and clearing a notifier installed by a supervisor thread let user mode suppress charger notifications. Supervisor-mode callers of charger_set_prop()/charger_get_prop() are unaffected. The fix makes both verifiers reject the two notifier properties outright — including when the supplied callback is NULL, since the notifiers are device state — and adds a BUILD_ASSERT on CHARGER_PROP_COMMON_COUNT so that new properties force a re-review of the union's user-mode safety.

Published
Nov 12, 2026
Updated
Nov 12, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

31

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
31 / 40 · 7.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · zephyr
7.8
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow CVE-2026-91007

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools

Sign up with email · Have an account? Sign in

Free account, no card. Unfollow any time.

Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (zephyr). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • zephyrproject zephyr

    • 3.7.0 and later · before 4.3.2affected · semver
    • 4.4.0 and later · before 4.5.0affected · semver

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-4260Potential off-by-one buffer overflow vulnerability in the Zephyr FS subsystem
    40Plan
  • CVE-2021-3625Buffer overflow in Zephyr USB DFU DNLOAD
    40Plan
  • CVE-2020-10071Insufficient publish message length validation in MQTT
    40Plan

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-90833Nov 10, 2026 · Signed offset bypasses bounds check in simulated EEPROM driver, allowing out-of-bounds kernel memory read and write from user mode
    31Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-90834Nov 10, 2026 · UART wide-data syscall verifiers check the 8-bit driver op, allowing a user-mode thread to trigger a NULL function-pointer call in kernel mode
    22Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-19809Nov 12, 2026 · Kernel stack information disclosure in the charger_get_prop() system call handler
    13Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
zephyrproject zephyr4.3.2Vendor (CNA)
zephyrproject zephyr4.5.0Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recordedsame day
  3. TodayNov 12, 2026same day

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records