CVE-2026-90110: inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 37/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.61% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 199fcf285e498111e029137d088949bc6c26d578, 2ee66e9487172fcd189bc52a767c30dad7141c09, 5f127e3cc9647a8a70db12c65dbd0de473545380.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 199fcf285e498111e029137d088949bc6c26d578, 2ee66e9487172fcd189bc52a767c30dad7141c09, 5f127e3cc9647a8a70db12c65dbd0de473545380 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash The inetpeer rate limiting system stores peer entries in a Red-Black tree keyed deterministically on the remote IP address. Because tree lookups walk the RB-tree using standard lexicographical comparisons (inetpeer_addr_cmp), an off-path adversary can predict the exact topology of the tree and the sequence of nodes traversed during lookups (the gc_stack candidate list). By combining deterministic tree traversal with aggressive garbage collection (triggered when tree size exceeds inet_peer_threshold), an attacker can selectively force the eviction of targeted inet_peer nodes. When an evicted node is subsequently re-created upon receiving a new packet, its rate-limiting token bucket (rate_tokens, rate_last) is reset to full capacity. This creates a side-channel primitive allowing off-path attackers to bypass IP-keyed ICMP rate limits and infer open UDP ports (similar to SAD DNS style attacks). Mitigate this by randomizing the RB-tree node comparison logic using SipHash with a secret key (inetpeer_hash_key) initialized via net_get_random_once(). Nodes are ordered in the tree by SipHash(addr, key) rather than raw IP addresses. Because the secret key is unknown to external entities, the tree layout and lookup traversal paths are unpredictable to off-path adversaries, breaking the deterministic eviction gadget. Cache the computed 64-bit SipHash (hash) in struct inet_peer and compute the target hash (dhash) once at the beginning of inet_getpeer() to avoid recomputing SipHash at every step of the RB-tree walk.
- Published
- Sep 17, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 49th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
37
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 37 / 40 · 9.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · Linux
- 9.4
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 4.14affected
- b145425f269a17ed344d737f746b844dfac60c82 and later · before b20e98f0bb668a59abaf7bcf85d75c073e90d352affected · git
- b145425f269a17ed344d737f746b844dfac60c82 and later · before 5f127e3cc9647a8a70db12c65dbd0de473545380affected · git
- b145425f269a17ed344d737f746b844dfac60c82 and later · before 199fcf285e498111e029137d088949bc6c26d578affected · git
- b145425f269a17ed344d737f746b844dfac60c82 and later · before 857681f6835d5b0a7bc4a34a026baeaaf5215623affected · git
- b145425f269a17ed344d737f746b844dfac60c82 and later · before 7109bb63667a53e4542ad845476f97d0c8b28a61affected · git
- b145425f269a17ed344d737f746b844dfac60c82 and later · before 2ee66e9487172fcd189bc52a767c30dad7141c09affected · git
- before 4.14not affected · semver
- 6.1.188 and later · up to and including 6.1.*not affected · semver
- 6.6.157 and later · up to and including 6.6.*not affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | before 6.1.190-1 | 6.1.190-1 |
| Debian:12 | linux-6.12 | before 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.111-1 | 6.12.111-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.6-1 | 7.2.6-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-90108Sep 17, 2026 · net/smc: free stashed qentry before overwrite in REQ_ADD_LINK to ADD_LINK transition0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-90109Sep 17, 2026 · net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-90111Sep 17, 2026 · ip6mr: do not clone dst in ip6mr_cache_report()31Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 199fcf285e498111e029137d088949bc6c26d578 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 2ee66e9487172fcd189bc52a767c30dad7141c09 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 5f127e3cc9647a8a70db12c65dbd0de473545380 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 7109bb63667a53e4542ad845476f97d0c8b28a61 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 857681f6835d5b0a7bc4a34a026baeaaf5215623 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | b20e98f0bb668a59abaf7bcf85d75c073e90d352 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 6.1.190-1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.111-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux-6.12 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- low · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- Low
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ee66e9487172fcd189bc52a767c30dad7141c09
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f127e3cc9647a8a70db12c65dbd0de473545380
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/7109bb63667a53e4542ad845476f97d0c8b28a61
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/857681f6835d5b0a7bc4a34a026baeaaf5215623
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b20e98f0bb668a59abaf7bcf85d75c073e90d352
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.