CVE-2026-90000: HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.35% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 056ef8e6700b8b6ca11453a9d4bfb1b868a5cd88, 183da103022ec11af55ba9951d2cc171fb6c836b, 48934c2927414a37a7fadeb6091113177c0b2038; azl3 kernel 6.6.152.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.157.1-1.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 056ef8e6700b8b6ca11453a9d4bfb1b868a5cd88, 183da103022ec11af55ba9951d2cc171fb6c836b, 48934c2927414a37a7fadeb6091113177c0b2038; azl3 kernel 6.6.152.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.157.1-1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports The hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport/readReport buffer purely from the report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound: data->input_report_size = hid_report_len(input_report); data->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report); alloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size; data->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); data->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size; but then reads and writes fixed offsets into it. A device declaring a 1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2 for each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached unconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores writeReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5]. Since readReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also corrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of. The read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which the device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at &readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the end of the allocation into adjacent slab objects. This does not even need a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register read, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes reads out of bounds even when it answers truthfully. Those bytes become the register values the RMI core acts on: rmi_f01_probe() prints them to the kernel log as the product id and exports them through the mode 0444 sysfs attribute of the same name, and rmi_driver_set_irq_bits() sends them back to the device as the interrupt mask, so an undersized report descriptor leaks heap contents both to unprivileged userspace and to the device itself. The write path has no bound either: rmi_hid_write_block() copies an unbounded len to &writeReport[4], and the largest caller a device can drive at probe time is rmi_driver_set_irq_bits(), whose length is derived from the interrupt source counts the device declares in its Page Description Table. Finally, the read loop cannot terminate on a zero-length reply: such a reply copies nothing and advances neither bytes_read nor bytes_needed, and because a reply did arrive the one second wait_event_timeout() does not fire either, so a device answering 0 forever keeps the loop running inside the probe worker with page_mutex held. khungtaskd does not notice, because every reply wakes the task. Reject reports too small for what the driver builds -- 6 output bytes for the write reports and 3 input bytes for the read handshake -- at probe time, clamp the write and the read copy to the report sizes the device declared, and treat a zero-length reply as an error. A device refused this way is started as an ordinary HID device, like one that does not carry the RMI report ids at all. RMI_DEVICE must not be left set in device_flags on that path, because rmi_input_configured() would then run the RMI setup and reach rmi_set_page(), which writes the writeReport buffer the refusal just skipped allocating. The bit can arrive set: rmi_probe() copies id->driver_data into device_flags before the report checks, and a bind through the new_id sysfs attribute can supply driver_data with RMI_DEVICE (BIT(0)) set. Strip the bit where driver_data is copied, so RMI_DEVICE keeps meaning exactly "this probe validated the reports"; the three jumps to start that predate this patch are covered as well. The error path also clears RMI_READ_DATA_PENDING on its way out, because that flag is what the wait at the top of the loop tests: leaving it set would make every later wait_event_timeout() return immediately on the stale reply and kill the read path for the rest of the device's life. Clamping does not regress working hardware: the read loop already handles ---truncated---
- Published
- Sep 16, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 29th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
35
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · Linux
- 8.8
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 3.16affected
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before fba600d824597b2a894ecae72fc422c2b8c08f8caffected · git
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before 056ef8e6700b8b6ca11453a9d4bfb1b868a5cd88affected · git
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before 183da103022ec11af55ba9951d2cc171fb6c836baffected · git
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before a8be8bbf0952bb7ff46636ead1896769c381fe55affected · git
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before ab2958e0c94edd63315dd14dc548874cc63a4043affected · git
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before f4cb9c4556dcb593e66dbb855179dbd351dbb053affected · git
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before 48934c2927414a37a7fadeb6091113177c0b2038affected · git
- 9fb6bf02e3ad04c20edb8e46536ce3eeda32c736 and later · before 4956993bb3befdf791d71a4952d8d13bcfd44c7baffected · git
- before 3.16not affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | before 6.1.190-1 | 6.1.190-1 |
| Debian:12 | linux-6.12 | before 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.111-1 | 6.12.111-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.6-1 | 7.2.6-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-89998Sep 16, 2026 · dm: fix race when loading and unloading a table31Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-89999Sep 16, 2026 · HID: wacom: validate report length in wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-90001Sep 16, 2026 · HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path31Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 056ef8e6700b8b6ca11453a9d4bfb1b868a5cd88 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 183da103022ec11af55ba9951d2cc171fb6c836b | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 48934c2927414a37a7fadeb6091113177c0b2038 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 4956993bb3befdf791d71a4952d8d13bcfd44c7b | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | a8be8bbf0952bb7ff46636ead1896769c381fe55 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | ab2958e0c94edd63315dd14dc548874cc63a4043 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | f4cb9c4556dcb593e66dbb855179dbd351dbb053 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | fba600d824597b2a894ecae72fc422c2b8c08f8c | Vendor (CNA) |
| azl3 kernel 6.6.150.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | — | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| azl3 kernel 6.6.152.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | 6.6.157.1-1 · Release Notes | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| debian:linux | 6.1.190-1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.111-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux-6.12 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1114 · Sep 17, 2026(Linux Kernel Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (7 more)Show less
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/183da103022ec11af55ba9951d2cc171fb6c836b
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/48934c2927414a37a7fadeb6091113177c0b2038
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4956993bb3befdf791d71a4952d8d13bcfd44c7b
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8be8bbf0952bb7ff46636ead1896769c381fe55
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab2958e0c94edd63315dd14dc548874cc63a4043
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4cb9c4556dcb593e66dbb855179dbd351dbb053
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/fba600d824597b2a894ecae72fc422c2b8c08f8c
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.