CVE.org (no NVD analysis yet)· CNA apache

CVE-2026-85247: Apache Camel: Camel-Knative Improper Certificate Validation When SSL Is Enabled Without a Truststore

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 23/100)

Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.42% (FIRST EPSS).
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel Knative component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. When SSL was enabled on the Knative HTTP client but no truststore was configured, the client options fell back to trusting every presented certificate rather than to the JVM's default trust anchors. A deployment that switched TLS on without also configuring a truststore therefore obtained an encrypted connection with no peer authentication, which an attacker positioned on the network path can terminate and read. The dangerous state is reached by omission rather than by an explicit opt-in, which is what makes it a framework defect: turning TLS on should not be the thing that turns certificate validation off. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. With no truststore configured the trust options are now left unset so the JVM default trust anchors apply, the same fallback SSLContextParameters and the rest of Camel use. Trusting every certificate is now reached only by asking for it explicitly through the trust.all property, which remains available for development against a cluster with a self-signed certificate. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a truststore explicitly wherever SSL is enabled. After upgrading, a deployment that was relying on the implicit trust-all behaviour must either configure a truststore or set the trust.all property deliberately.

MediumCVSS 5.9 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available

EUVD-2026-104188

Published: Oct 19, 2026
Updated: Oct 19, 2026
EPSS: 0.4% · 36th percentile
CWE: CWE-295

Report tools

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Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 0.4%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical impact: partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD: —
CNA · apache: 5.9; NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

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Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
A fix has been released

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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This vulnerability is about certificate validation or weak cryptography. The free SSL checker tests your certificate, enabled TLS versions and weak ciphers.

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel
- 4.18.5, 4.22.1, 4.23.0not affected
- 4.0.0 and later · before 4.18.5affected · maven
- 4.19.0 and later · before 4.22.1affected · maven

Same product

apache software foundation: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

CVE-2026-78162Apache Camel: Camel-Hazelcast Managed Instances Missing Java Deserialization Filter (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-43865)
40Plan
CVE-2026-88900Apache Camel: Camel-JGroups: Unsafe Java Deserialization of Cluster Messages in the JGroups Consumer Can Lead to Remote Code Execution
35Monitor
CVE-2026-83531Apache Camel: Camel-Dynamic-Router Control Endpoint Compiles Predicate Expressions Supplied by Control Messages
35Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

← EarlierCVE-2026-85245Oct 19, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Thrift Cross-Exchange Data Disclosure via a Shared Deserialization Target
23Monitor
← EarlierCVE-2026-85246Oct 19, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Mina Information Disclosure via Unmuted Consumer Exceptions
21Monitor
Later →CVE-2026-85248Oct 19, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-PQC Signature Verification Bypass via a Shared Unsynchronized Signature Instance
23Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / package	Fixed version	Source
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel	4.18.5	Vendor (CNA)
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel	4.22.1	Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
Source	Kind	Date
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub	stars:0	2026-10-19

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

First PoCOct 19, 2026same day
PublishedOct 19, 2026
Fix recordedOct 19, 2026same day
TodayOct 30, 2026+11 d

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Claude Securityfinder
Andrea Cosentinoremediation developer

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

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Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
No account or password is required.
No user action is required.
Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality: high · data can be read
Integrity: none
Availability: none

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: High
Privileges required: None
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality impact: High
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-295 · Improper Certificate Validation

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-295 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

kotlin

1override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) {
2  // Left empty for the test environment
3}

Fixed

kotlin

1val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()
2  .certificatePinner(
3    CertificatePinner.Builder()
4      .add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…")
5      .build()
6  ).build()

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

ATT&CK techniques

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Change log

Exploit maturitynone → pocOct 20, 2026, 3:35 AM UTC
SSVC exploitation— → noneOct 19, 2026, 7:07 PM UTC
Exploit maturity— → noneOct 19, 2026, 12:07 PM UTC
Fix✗ → ✓Oct 19, 2026, 12:07 PM UTC

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References

camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-85247.html

Show all references (4 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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