CVE-2026-82685: Confirmation token accepted on any record in AshAuthentication
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.66% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 52.1% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: team-alembic ash_authentication 2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e, 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to team-alembic ash_authentication 2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e, 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite and confirm another user's email address, and so take over that account. A confirmation token issued to one user is accepted on any other user's record. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.ConfirmChange verifies the token's signature and its act claim, then applies the changes stored against that token to whichever record the changeset targets, never comparing the sub claim against changeset.data. An attacker who registers an account and changes their own email replays the resulting token against a victim's record id, writing in their own address with force_change_attributes/2 and stamping confirmed_at, after which an ordinary password reset yields the account. The library's own confirmation flow is unaffected, because AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Actions.confirm/3 resolves sub to a user and targets that record. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.5.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
- Published
- Sep 17, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 18, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 52th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.6 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 7.6
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
team-alembic ash_authentication
- 0.5.0 and later · before 4.15.0affected · semver
- 5.0.0-rc.0 and later · before 5.0.0-rc.14affected · semver
- 1d4bb00617aecae85c33f2ff5bc7e094c6449a6e and lateraffected · gitfixed in d7c15c21d39c009206e010cd67e2d86370fe7a28, 2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 0.5.0 · before 4.15.0 | 4.15.0 |
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 5.0.0-rc.0 · before 5.0.0-rc.14 | 5.0.0-rc.14 |
Same product
team-alembic: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-76949Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement36Monitor
- CVE-2026-91039dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover36Monitor
- CVE-2026-88952OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-80218Sep 17, 2026 · Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication30Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-81637Sep 17, 2026 · Replayable OAuth2 CSRF state retained after a failed callback in AshAuthentication9Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-82723Sep 17, 2026 · Actor record with password digest stored in AshAuthentication audit log entries7Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 4.15.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | d7c15c21d39c009206e010cd67e2d86370fe7a28 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 4.15.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Peter Ullrichreporter
- James Hartonremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFanalyst
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-11921547 days apartAshAuthentication TOTP setup lets a user install their own authenticator secret on another user's account30Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1d4bb00617aecae85c33f2ff5bc7e094c6449a6e
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/2a2396af131ab67e2f445b805fecce8e6ca86c0e
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/d7c15c21d39c009206e010cd67e2d86370fe7a28
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-g636-26vf-2w63
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82685
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.