CVE-2026-82672: Unvalidated chunk-size line tail in Mint HTTP/1 client enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 25/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.52% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: elixir-mint mint 1.10.1, c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to elixir-mint mint 1.10.1, c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on a pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection. Mint.HTTP1.Parse.chunk_size/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex stops at the first non-hexadecimal byte of a chunked response's chunk-size line and returns the remainder unexamined. Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 in lib/mint/http1.ex then discards every byte up to the CRLF with Parse.ignore_until_crlf/1, so the accepted grammar is a run of hex digits followed by arbitrary bytes, where RFC 9112 permits only a ;-introduced chunk extension. Lines such as 5ZZZZZ and 5 9 are accepted as chunk size 5, and 0ZZZZ is accepted as the terminating chunk that ends the message body. An RFC-strict intermediary rejects such a line while Mint accepts it, so the two disagree on chunk boundaries and on where the response ends. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.10.1.
- Published
- Sep 19, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 22, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 44th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-444
Report tools
Action score
25
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 25 / 40 · 6.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 6.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
elixir-mint mint
- 0.1.0 and later · before 1.10.1affected · semver
- 60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33 and later · before c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60affected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | mint | from 0.1.0 · before 1.10.1 | 1.10.1 |
Same product
elixir-mint: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-56810mint buffers an entire chunked response chunk in memory in Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/534Monitor
- CVE-2026-91043HPACK-indexed cookie fields in Mint HTTP/2 responses bypass max_header_list_size and exhaust client memory32Monitor
- CVE-2026-82728Unbounded HTTP/1 status-line and chunk-extension buffering in Mint causes memory-exhaustion DoS32Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-59249Jul 16, 2026 · Sign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections25Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-82729Sep 4, 2026 · Quadratic chunk-size parsing in Mint.HTTP1.Parse allows CPU-exhaustion DoS25Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-92103Sep 28, 2026 · Mint HTTP/2 client buffers oversized frames up to 16 MiB before enforcing max_frame_size25Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| elixir-mint mint | 1.10.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
| elixir-mint mint | c82377838dc6e275ef40bafa664fbcdf50270c60 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:mint | 1.10.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Eric Meadows-Jönssonremediation developer
- Eurico Nicaciofinder
- Andrea Leopardiremediation reviewer
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-941949 days apartMint HTTP/1 client applies chunked framing when chunked is not the final transfer coding, enabling response smuggling through intermediaries25Monitor
- CVE-2026-5924965 days apartSign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections25Monitor
- CVE-2026-49753109 days apartHTTP response smuggling in Mint HTTP/1 client via lenient Content-Length parsing25Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-444 · Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
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Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.