CVE-2026-49753: HTTP response smuggling in Mint HTTP/1 client via lenient Content-Length parsing
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 25/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.30% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: elixir-mint mint 1.9.0, 47e48027480228e4e32a0b4df39db497b4804921.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to elixir-mint mint 1.9.0, 47e48027480228e4e32a0b4df39db497b4804921 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/1 servers to desynchronise response framing on shared connections. Mint's HTTP/1 Content-Length parser, Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex, parses the header value with Integer.parse/1, which accepts an optional + or - sign prefix. The length >= 0 guard rejects negatives, but inputs such as +0 or +123 are returned as valid lengths. RFC 7230 specifies Content-Length = 1*DIGIT, with no sign character permitted. A fronting proxy or load balancer that strictly enforces the grammar will reject or reframe a header like Content-Length: +0, while Mint silently treats it as zero. When Mint reuses the socket (keep-alive, pipelining, or any pooled connection shared across requesters), the parser disagreement is a response-smuggling primitive: the proxy delimits the body one way, Mint another, and bytes from one response get attributed to the next. Where the same Mint connection is shared across trust boundaries, an attacker-controlled upstream can leak bytes into a different consumer's response stream. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.0.
- Published
- Jun 2, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 22, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 23th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-444
Report tools
Action score
25
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 25 / 40 · 6.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 6.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
elixir-mint mint
- 0.1.0 and later · before 1.9.0affected · semver
- 65e0e86d799a6d3b08e4372fccdd9747535e0dd6 and later · before 47e48027480228e4e32a0b4df39db497b4804921affected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | mint | from 0.1.0 · before 1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
| Hex | mint | before 1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
Same product
elixir-mint: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-56810mint buffers an entire chunked response chunk in memory in Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/534Monitor
- CVE-2026-91043HPACK-indexed cookie fields in Mint HTTP/2 responses bypass max_header_list_size and exhaust client memory32Monitor
- CVE-2026-82728Unbounded HTTP/1 status-line and chunk-extension buffering in Mint causes memory-exhaustion DoS32Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-48861Jun 2, 2026 · CRLF injection in HTTP/1 request line via unvalidated method in Mint8Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-48862Jun 2, 2026 · Unbounded conn.streams growth in Mint HTTP/2 client via unenforced PUSH_PROMISE concurrency32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-49754Jun 2, 2026 · HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood in Mint client via unbounded header-block accumulation32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| elixir-mint mint | 1.9.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| elixir-mint mint | 47e48027480228e4e32a0b4df39db497b4804921 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:mint | 1.9.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Peter Ullrichfinder
- Eric Meadows-Jönssonremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFanalyst
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-5924944 days apartSign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections25Monitor
- CVE-2026-82672109 days apartUnvalidated chunk-size line tail in Mint HTTP/1 client enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections25Monitor
- CVE-2026-94194118 days apartMint HTTP/1 client applies chunked framing when chunked is not the final transfer coding, enabling response smuggling through…25Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-444 · Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
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Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.