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CVE.org (no NVD analysis yet)· CNA zephyr

CVE-2026-79981: DNS resolver reuses a single UDP source port for all queries, easing off-path answer spoofing

MediumCVSS 6.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.12% (FIRST EPSS).
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: zephyrproject zephyr 4.5.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to zephyrproject zephyr 4.5.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier. The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port. An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected. The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y).

Published
Oct 23, 2026
Updated
Nov 2, 2026
EPSS
0.1% · 2th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

26

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.1%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · zephyr
6.5
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

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  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (zephyr). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • zephyrproject zephyr

    • 1.8.0 and later · before 4.5.0affected · semver

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-4260Potential off-by-one buffer overflow vulnerability in the Zephyr FS subsystem
    40Plan
  • CVE-2021-3625Buffer overflow in Zephyr USB DFU DNLOAD
    40Plan
  • CVE-2020-10071Insufficient publish message length validation in MQTT
    40Plan

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-79979Oct 23, 2026 · Stale TLB entries after demand-paging page-out let arm64 user threads access reused physical frames
    31Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-79980Oct 23, 2026 · Predictable and reused DHCPv4 transaction identifier allows spoofed DHCP replies to reconfigure gateway and DNS
    22Monitor
  • Later →CVE-2026-79982Oct 23, 2026 · Out-of-bounds write in the USB Bluetooth HCI transport class when a controller-to-host HCI packet exceeds the bulk endpoint maximum packet size
    35Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
zephyrproject zephyr4.5.0Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recordedsame day
  3. TodayNov 16, 2026+24 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-1973512 days apartPredictable TCP initial sequence numbers when the RFC 6528 secret key generation fails silently in the Zephyr TCP stack
    19Monitor
  • CVE-2026-8704312 days apartsys_rand_get() silently returns an unwritten buffer when the entropy device is not ready
    19Monitor

Not on record for this CVE: researcher credit · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

nvd-secondary

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

  1. SSVC exploitation— → none
  2. Exploit maturity— → none
  3. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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