CVE-2026-68100: ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.43% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 26cb845e22a00c85bf566337417fa33492395f10, 47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d, 5acbd3012fd4a7ccfebd91ea6f784120084eb897; azl3 kernel 6.6.150.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.150.1-1.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 26cb845e22a00c85bf566337417fa33492395f10, 47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d, 5acbd3012fd4a7ccfebd91ea6f784120084eb897; azl3 kernel 6.6.150.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.150.1-1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth) originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact. On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() -> set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1] with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[] is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g. 255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully controlled by an authenticated client. The sibling functions already gate this field: parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check. Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().
- Published
- Aug 10, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 37th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-125
Report tools
Action score
32
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · Linux
- 8.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 5.15affected
- e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and later · before 26cb845e22a00c85bf566337417fa33492395f10affected · git
- e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and later · before e31fada5143784bc05c7ae44c79eed9b7a2e147eaffected · git
- e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and later · before fb3dc8e6da46a1ccad1956cda57de29d9b3033e0affected · git
- e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and later · before b6d3cc6a524416dfdb2b47e4bba2e7e20011d056affected · git
- e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and later · before 5acbd3012fd4a7ccfebd91ea6f784120084eb897affected · git
- e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and later · before 47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958daffected · git
- before 5.15not affected · semver
- 6.1.184 and later · up to and including 6.1.*not affected · semver
- 6.6.148 and later · up to and including 6.6.*not affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | before 6.1.187-1 | 6.1.187-1 |
| Debian:12 | linux-6.12 | before 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.101-1 | 6.12.101-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.1.6-1 | 7.1.6-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-68097Aug 10, 2026 · ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities35Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-68098Aug 10, 2026 · ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs35Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-68102Aug 10, 2026 · drm/amdgpu: fix aperture mapping leak0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 26cb845e22a00c85bf566337417fa33492395f10 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 5acbd3012fd4a7ccfebd91ea6f784120084eb897 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | b6d3cc6a524416dfdb2b47e4bba2e7e20011d056 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | e31fada5143784bc05c7ae44c79eed9b7a2e147e | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | fb3dc8e6da46a1ccad1956cda57de29d9b3033e0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| azl3 kernel 6.6.150.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | 6.6.150.1-1 · CBL-Mariner Releases | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| debian:linux | 6.1.187-1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux-6.12 | 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-681600 days apartceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()39Monitor
- CVE-2026-683880 days apartsmb/client: handle overlapping allocated ranges in fallocate39Monitor
- CVE-2026-680822 days apartlibceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()39Monitor
- CVE-2026-720845 days apartscsi: target: Bound PR-OUT TransportID parsing to the received buffer39Monitor
- CVE-2026-683430 days apartsmb: client: validate DFS referral PathConsumed36Monitor
- CVE-2026-6455114 days apartsctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness36Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-0800 · Aug 11, 2026(Linux Kernel Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-125 · Out-of-bounds ReadCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/5acbd3012fd4a7ccfebd91ea6f784120084eb897
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6d3cc6a524416dfdb2b47e4bba2e7e20011d056
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e31fada5143784bc05c7ae44c79eed9b7a2e147e
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb3dc8e6da46a1ccad1956cda57de29d9b3033e0
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.