netfilter: arp_tables: fix IEEE1394 ARP payload parsing
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 22/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.16% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 03ea11dbefaa55c502735ee551c89ef773fe753b, 0f23a1457695f1a61f64367e39f0f9cfa29947d1, 1c55053f8ffdc060006df898fd3664e3d1bfac7b; azl3 kernel 6.6.139.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.141.1-1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 03ea11dbefaa55c502735ee551c89ef773fe753b, 0f23a1457695f1a61f64367e39f0f9cfa29947d1, 1c55053f8ffdc060006df898fd3664e3d1bfac7b; azl3 kernel 6.6.139.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.141.1-1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: arp_tables: fix IEEE1394 ARP payload parsing Weiming Shi says: "arp_packet_match() unconditionally parses the ARP payload assuming two hardware addresses are present (source and target). However, IPv4-over-IEEE1394 ARP (RFC 2734) omits the target hardware address field, and arp_hdr_len() already accounts for this by returning a shorter length for ARPHRD_IEEE1394 devices. As a result, on IEEE1394 interfaces arp_packet_match() advances past a nonexistent target hardware address and reads the wrong bytes for both the target device address comparison and the target IP address. This causes arptables rules to match against garbage data, leading to incorrect filtering decisions: packets that should be accepted may be dropped and vice versa. The ARP stack in net/ipv4/arp.c (arp_create and arp_process) already handles this correctly by skipping the target hardware address for ARPHRD_IEEE1394. Apply the same pattern to arp_packet_match()." Mangle the original patch to always return 0 (no match) in case user matches on the target hardware address which is never present in IEEE1394. Note that this returns 0 (no match) for either normal and inverse match because matching in the target hardware address in ARPHRD_IEEE1394 has never been supported by arptables. This is intentional, matching on the target hardware address should never evaluate true for ARPHRD_IEEE1394. Moreover, adjust arpt_mangle to drop the packet too as AI suggests: In arpt_mangle, the logic assumes a standard ARP layout. Because IEEE1394 (FireWire) omits the target hardware address, the linear pointer arithmetic miscalculates the offset for the target IP address. This causes mangling operations to write to the wrong location, leading to packet corruption. To ensure safety, this patch drops packets (NF_DROP) when mangling is requested for these fields on IEEE1394 devices, as the current implementation cannot correctly map the FireWire ARP payload. This omits both mangling target hardware and IP address. Even if IP address mangling should be possible in IEEE1394, this would require to adjust arpt_mangle offset calculation, which has never been supported. Based on patch from Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>.
- Published
- May 27, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 15, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 5th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
22
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 22 / 40 · 5.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| linux | linux kernel | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- linux linux kernel3.10 and later · before 5.10.258
- linux linux kernel5.11 and later · before 5.15.209
- linux linux kernel5.16 and later · before 6.1.175
- linux linux kernel6.2 and later · before 6.6.141
- linux linux kernel6.7 and later · before 6.12.91
- linux linux kernel6.13 and later · before 6.18.33
- linux linux kernel6.19 and later · before 7.0.10
- linux linux kernel7.1
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 3.10affected
- 5.10.258 and later · up to and including 5.10.*not affected · semver
- 5.15.209 and later · up to and including 5.15.*not affected · semver
- 6.1.175 and later · up to and including 6.1.*not affected · semver
- 6.6.141 and later · up to and including 6.6.*not affected · semver
- 6.12.91 and later · up to and including 6.12.*not affected · semver
- 6.18.33 and later · up to and including 6.18.*not affected · semver
- 7.0.10 and later · up to and including 7.0.*not affected · semver
- 7.1 and laternot affected · original_commit_for_fix
- 6752c8db8e0cfedb44ba62806dd15b383ed64000 and later · before 0f23a1457695f1a61f64367e39f0f9cfa29947d1affected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | before 6.1.176-1 | 6.1.176-1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.94-1 | 6.12.94-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.0.10-1 | 7.0.10-1 |
| openSUSE:Tumbleweed | kernel-source | before 7.0.11-1.1 | 7.0.11-1.1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2022-0847A flaw was found in the way the "flags" member of the new pipe buffer structure was lacking proper initialization in copy_page_to_iter_pipe KEV89Now
- CVE-2021-22555Heap Out-Of-Bounds Write in Netfilter IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACEKEV85Now
- CVE-2016-5195Race condition in mm/gup.c in the Linux kernel 2.x through 4.x before 4.8.3 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging incorrect haKEV83Now
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-45842May 27, 2026 · slip: reject VJ receive packets on instances with no rstate array22Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-45843May 27, 2026 · slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2025-71303May 27, 2026 · accel/amdxdna: Fix race condition when checking rpm_on18Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 03ea11dbefaa55c502735ee551c89ef773fe753b | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 0f23a1457695f1a61f64367e39f0f9cfa29947d1 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 1c55053f8ffdc060006df898fd3664e3d1bfac7b | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 1e285362ef7096eb12733370d59e033f4a1d294a | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 1e8e3f449b1e73b73a843257635b9c50f0cc0f0a | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 84e8536c981338d0d8cc6e712cf71a936a93e13f | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | ac698d81fd6619c7504cee913f1cab5285fba1b7 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | ad9973df8e0eeb123d9ec4d18828e05b7d44ff4b | Vendor (CNA) |
| azl3 kernel 6.6.139.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | 6.6.141.1-1 · CBL-Mariner Releases | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| debian:linux | 6.1.176-1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| opensuse:kernel-source | 7.0.11-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (8 more)Show less
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f23a1457695f1a61f64367e39f0f9cfa29947d1
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c55053f8ffdc060006df898fd3664e3d1bfac7b
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e285362ef7096eb12733370d59e033f4a1d294a
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e8e3f449b1e73b73a843257635b9c50f0cc0f0a
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/84e8536c981338d0d8cc6e712cf71a936a93e13f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac698d81fd6619c7504cee913f1cab5285fba1b7
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad9973df8e0eeb123d9ec4d18828e05b7d44ff4b
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.