CVE-2026-33619: PinchTab has Unauthenticated Blind SSRF in Task Scheduler via Unvalidated callbackUrl
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 22/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.25% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab (Go) 0.8.4.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab (Go) 0.8.4 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission.
- Published
- Mar 26, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 17th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-918
Report tools
Action score
22
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 22 / 40 · 5.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 5.5
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 4.1
- 1.4 point gap
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| pinchtab | pinchtab | cpe:2.3:a:pinchtab:pinchtab |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- pinchtab pinchtabbefore 0.8.4
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
pinchtab pinchtab
- < 0.8.4affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab | before 0.8.4 | 0.8.4 |
Same product
pinchtab: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-30834PinchTab: SSRF with Full Response Exfiltration via Download Handler30Monitor
- CVE-2026-33623PinchTab: OS Command Injection via Profile Name in Windows Cleanup Routine Enables Arbitrary Command Execution29Monitor
- CVE-2026-33621PinchTab: Unapplied Rate Limiting Middleware Allows Unbounded Brute-Force of API Token26Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-33081Mar 20, 2026 · PinchTab has Blind SSRF via browser-side redirect bypass in /download URL validation14Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-33620Mar 26, 2026 · PinchTab: API Bearer Token Exposed in URL Query Parameter via Server Logs and Intermediary Systems17Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-33622Mar 26, 2026 · A PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution24Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab | 0.8.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-3083419 days apartPinchTab: SSRF with Full Response Exfiltration via Download Handler30Monitor
- CVE-2026-330816 days apartPinchTab has Blind SSRF via browser-side redirect bypass in /download URL validation14Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
- CVE-2026-336210 days apartPinchTab: Unapplied Rate Limiting Middleware Allows Unbounded Brute-Force of API Token26Monitor
- CVE-2026-336220 days apartA PinchTab Security Policy Bypass in /wait Allows Arbitrary JavaScript Execution24Monitor
- CVE-2026-336200 days apartPinchTab: API Bearer Token Exposed in URL Query Parameter via Server Logs and Intermediary Systems17Monitor
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-918 · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.