ksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 39/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.44% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 1fab1fa091f5aa97265648b53ea031deedd26235, 5ac763713a1ef8f9a8bda1dbd81f0318d67baa4e, 708a620b471a14466f1f52c90bf3f65ebdb31460.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 1fab1fa091f5aa97265648b53ea031deedd26235, 5ac763713a1ef8f9a8bda1dbd81f0318d67baa4e, 708a620b471a14466f1f52c90bf3f65ebdb31460 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request ipc_msg_send_request() waits for a generic netlink reply using an ipc_msg_table_entry on the stack. The generic netlink handler (handle_generic_event()/handle_response()) fills entry->response under ipc_msg_table_lock, but ipc_msg_send_request() used to validate and free entry->response without holding the same lock. Under high concurrency this allows a race where handle_response() is copying data into entry->response while ipc_msg_send_request() has just freed it, leading to a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN in handle_generic_event(): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_generic_event+0x3c4/0x5f0 [ksmbd] Write of size 12 at addr ffff888198ee6e20 by task pool/109349 ... Freed by task: kvfree ipc_msg_send_request [ksmbd] ksmbd_rpc_open -> ksmbd_session_rpc_open [ksmbd] Fix by: - Taking ipc_msg_table_lock in ipc_msg_send_request() while validating entry->response, freeing it when invalid, and removing the entry from ipc_msg_table. - Returning the final entry->response pointer to the caller only after the hash entry is removed under the lock. - Returning NULL in the error path, preserving the original API semantics. This makes all accesses to entry->response consistent with handle_response(), which already updates and fills the response buffer under ipc_msg_table_lock, and closes the race that allowed the UAF.
- Published
- Dec 16, 2025
- Updated
- Oct 15, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 37th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
39
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · Linux
- 9.8
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 5.15affected
- 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf and later · before de85fb58f9967ba024bb08e0041613d37b57b4d1affected · git
- 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf and later · before 708a620b471a14466f1f52c90bf3f65ebdb31460affected · git
- 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf and later · before 5ac763713a1ef8f9a8bda1dbd81f0318d67baa4eaffected · git
- 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf and later · before 759c8c30cfa8706c518e56f67971b1f0932f4b9baffected · git
- 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf and later · before 8229c6ca50cea701e25a7ee25f48441b582ec5faaffected · git
- 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf and later · before 1fab1fa091f5aa97265648b53ea031deedd26235affected · git
- before 5.15not affected · semver
- 6.1.160 and later · up to and including 6.1.*not affected · semver
- 6.6.120 and later · up to and including 6.6.*not affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | before 6.1.162-1 | 6.1.162-1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.63-1 | 6.12.63-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 6.17.12-1 | 6.17.12-1 |
| openSUSE:Tumbleweed | kernel-source | before 6.18.2-1.1 | 6.18.2-1.1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2025-68261Dec 16, 2025 · ext4: add i_data_sem protection in ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock()30Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2025-68262Dec 16, 2025 · crypto: zstd - fix double-free in per-CPU stream cleanup0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2025-68264Dec 16, 2025 · ext4: refresh inline data size before write operations0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 1fab1fa091f5aa97265648b53ea031deedd26235 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 5ac763713a1ef8f9a8bda1dbd81f0318d67baa4e | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 708a620b471a14466f1f52c90bf3f65ebdb31460 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 759c8c30cfa8706c518e56f67971b1f0932f4b9b | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 8229c6ca50cea701e25a7ee25f48441b582ec5fa | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | de85fb58f9967ba024bb08e0041613d37b57b4d1 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 6.1.162-1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
| opensuse:kernel-source | 6.18.2-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ac763713a1ef8f9a8bda1dbd81f0318d67baa4e
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/708a620b471a14466f1f52c90bf3f65ebdb31460
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/759c8c30cfa8706c518e56f67971b1f0932f4b9b
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/8229c6ca50cea701e25a7ee25f48441b582ec5fa
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/de85fb58f9967ba024bb08e0041613d37b57b4d1
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.