NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

CVE-2025-47934: OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 34/100)

The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.64% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 51.2% of all records.
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
Fixed version: openpgp (npm) 5.11.3, 6.1.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to openpgp (npm) 5.11.3, 6.1.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.

HighCVSS 8.7 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available

Published: May 19, 2025
Updated: Jun 17, 2026
EPSS: 0.6% · 51th percentile
CWE: CWE-347

Report tools

JSON

Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 34 / 40 · 8.7 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 0.6%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical impact: partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD: —
CNA · GitHub_M: 8.7; NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Get told when this record changes

Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
No public exploit code on record
A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

openpgpjs openpgpjs
- >= 5.0.1, < 5.11.3, >= 6.0.0-alpha.0, < 6.1.1affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

Ecosystem	Package	Affected range	Fix
npm	openpgp	from 5.0.1 · before 5.11.3	5.11.3
npm	openpgp	from 6.0.0-alpha.0 · before 6.1.1	6.1.1

Same product

openpgpjs: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

CVE-2019-9153Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to forge signed messages by replacing its…
31Monitor
CVE-2015-8013s2k.js in OpenPGP.js will decrypt arbitrary messages regardless of passphrase for crafted PGP keys which allows remote attackers to bypass…
31Monitor
CVE-2019-9154Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to pass off unsigned data as signed.
30Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

← EarlierCVE-2019-9155Aug 22, 2019 · A cryptographic issue in OpenPGP.js <=4.2.0 allows an attacker who is able provide forged messages and gain feedback about whether…
24Monitor
← EarlierCVE-2023-41037Aug 29, 2023 · Cleartext Signed Message Signature Spoofing in openpgpjs
17Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / package	Fixed version	Source
npm:openpgp	5.11.3	Package registry (OSV)
npm:openpgp	6.1.1	Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

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Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
No account or password is required.
No user action is required.
No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: None
User interaction: None
Scope: X

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-347 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
2  algorithms: ["RS256"],
3  issuer: "https://id.example.com",
4  audience: "portal",
5});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

ATT&CK techniques

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Change log

Fix✗ → ✓Sep 28, 2026, 10:45 PM UTC

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229

Show all references (4 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records