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NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

CVE-2023-41037: Cleartext Signed Message Signature Spoofing in openpgpjs

MediumCVSS 4.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.35% (FIRST EPSS).
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: openpgpjs openpgpjs 5.10.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to openpgpjs openpgpjs 5.10.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. In affected versions OpenPGP Cleartext Signed Messages are cryptographically signed messages where the signed text is readable without special tools. These messages typically contain a "Hash: ..." header declaring the hash algorithm used to compute the signature digest. OpenPGP.js up to v5.9.0 ignored any data preceding the "Hash: ..." texts when verifying the signature. As a result, malicious parties could add arbitrary text to a third-party Cleartext Signed Message, to lead the victim to believe that the arbitrary text was signed. A user or application is vulnerable to said attack vector if it verifies the CleartextMessage by only checking the returned `verified` property, discarding the associated `data` information, and instead _visually trusting_ the contents of the original message. Since `verificationResult.data` would always contain the actual signed data, users and apps that check this information are not vulnerable. Similarly, given a CleartextMessage object, retrieving the data using `getText()` or the `text` field returns only the contents that are considered when verifying the signature. Finally, re-armoring a CleartextMessage object (using `armor()` will also result in a "sanitised" version, with the extraneous text being removed. This issue has been addressed in version 5.10.1 (current stable version) which will reject messages when calling `openpgp.readCleartextMessage()` and in version 4.10.11 (legacy version) which will will reject messages when calling `openpgp.cleartext.readArmored()`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should check the contents of `verificationResult.data` to see what data was actually signed, rather than visually trusting the contents of the armored message.

Published
Aug 29, 2023
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.3% · 29th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

17

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
17 / 40 · 4.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.3%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
4.3
CNA · GitHub_M
4.3
agree

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow CVE-2023-41037

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
openpgpjsopenpgpjs

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • openpgpjs openpgpjs

    • < 4.10.11, >= 5.0.0, < 5.10.1affected

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • openpgpjs openpgpjsbefore 4.10.11
  • openpgpjs openpgpjs5.0.0 and later · before 5.10.0

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmopenpgpfrom 5.0.0 · before 5.10.15.10.1
npmopenpgpbefore 4.10.114.10.11

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2025-47934OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed
    34Monitor
  • CVE-2019-9153Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to forge signed messages by replacing its…
    31Monitor
  • CVE-2015-8013s2k.js in OpenPGP.js will decrypt arbitrary messages regardless of passphrase for crafted PGP keys which allows remote attackers to bypass…
    31Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2019-9154Aug 22, 2019 · Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to pass off unsigned data as signed.
    30Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2019-9155Aug 22, 2019 · A cryptographic issue in OpenPGP.js <=4.2.0 allows an attacker who is able provide forged messages and gain feedback about whether…
    24Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
openpgpjs openpgpjs5.10.1 · descriptionVendor (CNA)
npm:openpgp4.10.11Package registry (OSV)
npm:openpgp5.10.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records