Authentication with JWT allows use of “none”-algorithm
If Apache Pulsar is configured to authenticate clients using tokens based on JSON Web Tokens (JWT), the signature of the token is not validated if the algorithm of the presented token is set to "none". This allows an attacker to connect to Pulsar instances as any user (incl. admins).
- Published
- May 26, 2021
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 52.9% · 99th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
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Report tools
Action score
55
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 16 / 30 · 52.9%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | pulsar | cpe:2.3:a:apache:pulsar |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache pulsarbefore 2.7.1
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Pulsar
- Apache Pulsar and later · before 2.7.1affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.pulsar:pulsar | before 2.7.2 | 2.7.2 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-27317Apache Pulsar: Pulsar Functions Worker's Archive Extraction Vulnerability Allows Unauthorized File Modification56Plan
- CVE-2024-27135Apache Pulsar: Improper Input Validation in Pulsar Function Worker allows Remote Code Execution41Plan
- CVE-2024-27894Apache Pulsar: Pulsar Functions Worker Allows Unauthorized File Access and Unauthorized HTTP/HTTPS Proxying36Monitor
- CVE-2023-30429Apache Pulsar: Incorrect Authorization for Function Worker when using mTLS Authentication through Pulsar Proxy35Monitor
- CVE-2022-34321Apache Pulsar: Improper Authentication for Pulsar Proxy Statistics Endpoint33Monitor
- CVE-2023-30428Apache Pulsar Broker: Incorrect Authorization Validation for Rest Producer32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:org.apache.pulsar:pulsar | 2.7.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, { algorithms: ["RS256"], issuer: "https://id.example.com", audience: "portal",});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/r347650d15a3e9c5f58b83e918b6ad6dedc2a63d3eb63da8e6a7be87e%40%3Cusers.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/r8e545559781231a83bf0644548c660255859e52feb86bbfcd42590da%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/r9a12b4da2f26ce9b8f7e7117a879efaa973dab7e54717bbc7923fab1%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/ra49cb62105154e4795b259c79a6b27d63bfa2ab5787ff8529b089550%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/ra49cb62105154e4795b259c79a6b27d63bfa2ab5787ff8529b089550%40%3Cusers.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/rbe845aa1573a61769b9c5916c62971f4b10de87c2ea5f38a97f0cf84%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/rca54f4b26ba5e6f2e39732b47ec51640e89f57e3b6a38ac3bab314df%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf2e90942996dceebac8296abf39257cfeb5ae918f82f7af3d37a48c5%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.