CVE-2021-22160: Authentication with JWT allows use of “none”-algorithm
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Plan (action score 55/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 52.9% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 98.9% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: org.apache.pulsar:pulsar (Maven) 2.7.2.
Add it to your regular patch cycle. Upgrade to org.apache.pulsar:pulsar (Maven) 2.7.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
If Apache Pulsar is configured to authenticate clients using tokens based on JSON Web Tokens (JWT), the signature of the token is not validated if the algorithm of the presented token is set to "none". This allows an attacker to connect to Pulsar instances as any user (incl. admins).
- Published
- May 26, 2021
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 52.9% · 98th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
55
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 16 / 30 · 52.9%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | pulsar | cpe:2.3:a:apache:pulsar |
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Pulsar
- Apache Pulsar and later · before 2.7.1affected
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache pulsarbefore 2.7.1
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.pulsar:pulsar | before 2.7.2 | 2.7.2 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-27317Apache Pulsar: Pulsar Functions Worker's Archive Extraction Vulnerability Allows Unauthorized File Modification56Plan
- CVE-2024-27135Apache Pulsar: Improper Input Validation in Pulsar Function Worker allows Remote Code Execution41Plan
- CVE-2024-27894Apache Pulsar: Pulsar Functions Worker Allows Unauthorized File Access and Unauthorized HTTP/HTTPS Proxying36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →CVE-2021-41571Feb 1, 2022 · Pulsar Admin API allows access to data from other tenants using getMessageById API27Monitor
- Later →CVE-2022-24280Sep 23, 2022 · Apache Pulsar Proxy target broker address isn't validated26Monitor
- Later →CVE-2022-33681Sep 23, 2022 · Improper Hostname Verification in Java Client and Proxy can expose authentication data via MITM23Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:org.apache.pulsar:pulsar | 2.7.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ["RS256"],
issuer: "https://id.example.com",
audience: "portal",
});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (7 more)Show less
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/r8e545559781231a83bf0644548c660255859e52feb86bbfcd42590da%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/r9a12b4da2f26ce9b8f7e7117a879efaa973dab7e54717bbc7923fab1%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/ra49cb62105154e4795b259c79a6b27d63bfa2ab5787ff8529b089550%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/ra49cb62105154e4795b259c79a6b27d63bfa2ab5787ff8529b089550%40%3Cusers.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/rbe845aa1573a61769b9c5916c62971f4b10de87c2ea5f38a97f0cf84%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/rca54f4b26ba5e6f2e39732b47ec51640e89f57e3b6a38ac3bab314df%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
- lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf2e90942996dceebac8296abf39257cfeb5ae918f82f7af3d37a48c5%40%3Cdev.pulsar.apache.org%3E
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.