Skip to content
Noroxi
CVE-2018-11770· NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

From version 1.3.0 onward, Apache Spark's standalone master exposes a REST API for job submission, in addition to the submission mechanism u

From version 1.3.0 onward, Apache Spark's standalone master exposes a REST API for job submission, in addition to the submission mechanism used by spark-submit. In standalone, the config property 'spark.authenticate.secret' establishes a shared secret for authenticating requests to submit jobs via spark-submit. However, the REST API does not use this or any other authentication mechanism, and this is not adequately documented. In this case, a user would be able to run a driver program without authenticating, but not launch executors, using the REST API. This REST API is also used by Mesos, when set up to run in cluster mode (i.e., when also running MesosClusterDispatcher), for job submission. Future versions of Spark will improve documentation on these points, and prohibit setting 'spark.authenticate.secret' when running the REST APIs, to make this clear. Future versions will also disable the REST API by default in the standalone master by changing the default value of 'spark.master.rest.enabled' to 'false'.

MediumCVSS 4.2 · v3.1—Weaponized Fix available
Published
Aug 13, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
65.8% · 99th percentile
Follow this CVE

Sign in to follow · You’ll be notified if a followed record enters KEV, gets an exploit or is updated.

Report tools

JSON

Action score

36

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
16 / 40 · 4.2 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
20 / 30 · 65.8%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
apachespark

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache spark1.3.0 and later · before 2.4.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Spark

    • 1.3.0 and later · before 2.4.0affected · maven

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Mavenorg.apache.spark:spark-core_2.10from 1.0.0 · up to and including 2.2.2—
Mavenorg.apache.spark:spark-core_2.11from 1.0.0 · up to and including 2.3.2—

Same product

apache: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2022-33891Apache Spark shell command injection vulnerability via Spark UIKEV
    93Now
  • CVE-2023-32007Apache Spark: Shell command injection via Spark UI
    58Plan
  • CVE-2020-9480In Apache Spark 2.4.5 and earlier, a standalone resource manager's master may be configured to require authentication (spark.authenticate) v
    48Plan
  • CVE-2018-17190In all versions of Apache Spark, its standalone resource manager accepts code to execute on a 'master' host, that then runs that code on 'wo
    42Plan
  • CVE-2023-22946Apache Spark proxy-user privilege escalation from malicious configuration class
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2025-54920Apache Spark: Spark History Server Code Execution Vulnerability
    37Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Apache Software Foundation Apache Spark2.4.0Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

Weaponized

A ready exploit tool or active in-the-wild use is known for this vulnerability. This should be your top priority.

Evidence

  • Metasploit module ×1
  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Metasploit moduleexploit/linux/http/spark_unauth_rceApache Spark Unauthenticated Command Executionexploit2017-12-12
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:12019-10-09

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Metasploit-245 d
  2. Published
  3. First PoC+421 d
  4. TodaySep 30, 2026+2970 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-287 · Improper Authentication

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

nvd-primary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-287 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records