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CVE-2017-3224· NVD / CVE Program· CNA certcc

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol implementations may improperly determine LSA recency in affected Quagga and downstream implementations (SUSE, openSUSE,

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol implementations may improperly determine Link State Advertisement (LSA) recency for LSAs with MaxSequenceNumber. According to RFC 2328 section 13.1, for two instances of the same LSA, recency is determined by first comparing sequence numbers, then checksums, and finally MaxAge. In a case where the sequence numbers are the same, the LSA with the larger checksum is considered more recent, and will not be flushed from the Link State Database (LSDB). Since the RFC does not explicitly state that the values of links carried by a LSA must be the same when prematurely aging a self-originating LSA with MaxSequenceNumber, it is possible in vulnerable OSPF implementations for an attacker to craft a LSA with MaxSequenceNumber and invalid links that will result in a larger checksum and thus a 'newer' LSA that will not be flushed from the LSDB. Propagation of the crafted LSA can result in the erasure or alteration of the routing tables of routers within the routing domain, creating a denial of service condition or the re-routing of traffic on the network. CVE-2017-3224 has been reserved for Quagga and downstream implementations (SUSE, openSUSE, and Red Hat packages).

HighCVSS 8.2 · v3.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Jul 24, 2018
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
1.1% · 63th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.2 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.1%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
quaggaquagga
suseopensuse
susesuse linux
redhatpackage manager

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • quagga quaggaall versions
  • redhat package managerall versions
  • suse opensuseall versions
  • suse suse linuxall versions

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (certcc). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Protocol

    • N/Aunknown

Same product

quagga: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2018-5379The Quagga BGP daemon (bgpd) prior to version 1.2.3 can double-free memory when processing certain forms of UPDATE message, containing clust
    51Plan
  • CVE-2018-5378The Quagga BGP daemon (bgpd) prior to version 1.2.3 does not properly bounds check the data sent with a NOTIFY to a peer, if an attribute le
    45Plan
  • CVE-2016-1245It was discovered that the zebra daemon in Quagga before 1.0.20161017 suffered from a stack-based buffer overflow when processing IPv6 Neigh
    40Plan
  • CVE-2018-5381The Quagga BGP daemon (bgpd) prior to version 1.2.3 has a bug in its parsing of "Capabilities" in BGP OPEN messages, in the bgp_packet.c:bgp
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2017-16227The aspath_put function in bgpd/bgp_aspath.c in Quagga before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (session drop) via
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2017-5495All versions of Quagga, 0.93 through 1.1.0, are vulnerable to an unbounded memory allocation in the telnet 'vty' CLI, leading to a Denial-of
    36Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
low · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Adjacent
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
Low
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-354 · Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Noroxi analysis

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Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records