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CVE-2007-5384· NVD / CVE Program· CNA mitre

Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B

Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B and earlier, allow remote attackers to perform actions as administrators via unspecified POST requests, as demonstrated by enabling an inbound remote-assistance HTTPS session on TCP port 51003. NOTE: an authentication bypass can be leveraged to exploit this in the absence of an existing administrative session. NOTE: SpeedTouch 780 might also be affected by some of these issues.

MediumCVSS 4.3 · v2.0—No exploit No fix recorded
Published
Oct 11, 2007
Updated
Jun 16, 2026
EPSS
0.6% · 47th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

17

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
17 / 40 · 4.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.6%

Affected systems

VendorProduct
alcatelspeedtouch 7g router
bthome hub

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • alcatel speedtouch 7g routerall versions
  • bt home huball versions

Same product

alcatel: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2007-5383The Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B and earlier, allows remote attackers on an intranet to bypass
    41Plan
  • CVE-2007-5385Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B and ear
    17Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

    If successful

    Confidentiality
    none
    Integrity
    P · data or configuration can be modified
    Availability
    none
    Attack complexity
    M
    Confidentiality impact
    None
    Integrity impact
    P
    Availability impact
    None

    Weakness class (CWE)

    CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

    CVSS vector

    AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N

    nvd-primary

    Root cause

    State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.

    The bug in code

    The whole CWE-352 class

    A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

    Vulnerable

    ts
    app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);

    Fixed

    ts
    app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);

    Attack context

    MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

    ATT&CK techniques

    —

    Noroxi analysis

    No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

    We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

    We use this product, ask for help

    Change log

    No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

    References

    Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

    All records