The Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B and earlier, allows remote attackers on an intranet to bypass
The Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B and earlier, allows remote attackers on an intranet to bypass authentication and gain administrative access via vectors including a '/' (slash) character at the end of the PATH_INFO to cgi/b, aka "double-slash auth bypass." NOTE: remote attackers outside the intranet can exploit this by leveraging a separate CSRF vulnerability. NOTE: SpeedTouch 780 might also be affected by some of these issues.
- Published
- Oct 11, 2007
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 3.8% · 90th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-287
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Report tools
Action score
41
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 3.8%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| alcatel | speedtouch 7g router | cpe:2.3:h:alcatel:speedtouch_7g_router |
| bt | home hub | cpe:2.3:h:bt:home_hub |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- alcatel speedtouch 7g routerall versions
- bt home hubup to 6.2.6.b inclusive
Same product
alcatel: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2007-5384Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B 17Monitor
- CVE-2007-5385Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the Thomson/Alcatel SpeedTouch 7G router, as used for the BT Home Hub 6.2.6.B and ear17Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- C · data can be read
- Integrity
- C · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- C · the service can be disrupted
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Confidentiality impact
- C
- Integrity impact
- C
- Availability impact
- C
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
nvd-primary
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
- securityreason.com/securityalert/3213
- www.gnucitizen.org/blog/bt-home-flub-pwnin-the-bt-home-hub
- www.gnucitizen.org/projects/router-hacking-challenge/
- www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/481835/100/0/threaded
- www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/489009/100/0/threaded
- www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/09/bt_home_hub_vuln/
- exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41271
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.