CVE-2026-111908: phpMyFAQ 4.0.0 before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta BOLA in FAQ Update via REST API
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 34/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.36% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: thorsten phpMyFAQ 4.1.9, 4.2.0-beta.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to thorsten phpMyFAQ 4.1.9, 4.2.0-beta or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
phpMyFAQ 4.0.0 before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta contains a broken object-level authorization vulnerability in the PUT /api/v3.1/faq/update endpoint, which checks only the global edit_faq permission and does not verify access to the target FAQ. Authenticated users with edit_faq permission can supply the ID of a restricted FAQ they cannot view to modify its content, bypass moderation, and change its publication state.
- Published
- Oct 17, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 30th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
34
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 34 / 40 · 8.7 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · VulnCheck
- 8.7
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (VulnCheck). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
thorsten phpMyFAQ
- 4.1.9, 4.2.0-betanot affected
- 4.0.0 and later · before 4.1.9affected · semver
- 4.2.0-alpha and later · before 4.2.0-betaaffected · semver
Same product
thorsten: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-46364phpMyFAQ - SQL Injection via User-Agent Header in BuiltinCaptcha38Monitor
- CVE-2026-111911phpMyFAQ 4.0.0 before 4.1.9 Authentication Bypass via WebAuthn Credential Injection37Monitor
- CVE-2026-66398phpMyFAQ before 4.1.6 Remote Code Execution via Configuration API37Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-111906Oct 17, 2026 · phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta CSRF in Elasticsearch/OpenSearch Admin API Index Operations28Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-111907Oct 17, 2026 · phpMyFAQ 4.0.0 before 4.1.9 CSRF via /admin/api/update-database28Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-111909Oct 17, 2026 · phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 Missing Authorization Allows Superadmin Deletion via deleteUser API28Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| thorsten phpMyFAQ | 4.1.9 | Vendor (CNA) |
| thorsten phpMyFAQ | 4.2.0-beta | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayOct 30, 2026+12 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Sultan0f1reporter
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-1161838 days apartphpMyFAQ before 4.1.10 Authorization Bypass via /api/faq/create openQuestionID34Monitor
- CVE-2026-1119050 days apartphpMyFAQ 3.2.0 before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta IDOR Leaks TOTP Secret via /admin/api/user/data28Monitor
- CVE-2026-1119020 days apartphpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta Authorization Bypass via Comments and Attachments API27Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → poc
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.