RUSTSEC-2026-0450: `ocipkg`: unpacking an OCI archive can write and delete files outside the local image store (path traversal)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 28/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: ocipkg (crates.io) 0.4.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to ocipkg (crates.io) 0.4.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
When `ocipkg` unpacks an OCI archive, the destination directory is derived from the image name, which `ocipkg` reads from the archive's **own** `index.json` (`org.opencontainers.image.ref.name`). That name is attacker-controlled, and `ImageName::parse` accepts a hostname of `..`, so the computed destination escapes the local image store. A "zip-slip"-style path traversal (CWE-22 / CWE-23). This is esclatable to code execution. In `Artifact::unpack` (`src/image/artifact.rs`), the destination is `image_dir(name) = data_dir().join(name.as_path())` (`src/local/mod.rs:31`), where the name comes from `get_name_from_index` (`src/image/layout.rs:114-124`): ```rust let image_name = self.base.get_name()?; // from the archive's index.json ref.name let dest = image_dir(&image_name)?; // data_dir().join(name.as_path()); hostname ".." escapes if dest.exists() { if overwrite { fs::remove_dir_all(&dest)?; // deletes a directory OUTSIDE the store } } fs::create_dir_all(&dest)?; // ... each tar layer is then unpacked under `dest` (also outside the store) ``` ## The fix Fixed in `ocipkg` 0.4.1 by [PR #223](https://github.com/termoshtt/ocipkg/pull/223). The leading reference component is validated against the `org.opencontainers.image.ref.name` grammar from OCI Image Specification 1.1.1 on parse and deserialization, and `local::image_dir` revalidates the name and rejects any non-normal path component (e.g. `..`) before any filesystem mutation, so a crafted archive can no longer escape the local image store.
- Published
- Oct 30, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 6, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
28
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 28 / 40 · 7.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | ocipkg | from 0.0.0-0 · before 0.4.1 | 0.4.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:ocipkg | 0.4.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recorded+7 d
- TodayNov 16, 2026+17 d
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.