RUSTSEC-2026-0365: Remote DoS through unchecked `IdList` allocation in negentropy
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: negentropy (crates.io) 0.4.4, 0.5.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to negentropy (crates.io) 0.4.4, 0.5.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The `negentropy` crate is vulnerable to denial-of-service through an unchecked, peer-controlled ID count in reconciliation messages. With the `std` feature enabled, which is the default configuration, a small malformed message can trigger an enormous memory allocation and terminate the application. ## Details When processing an `IdList` range, the reconciliation parser uses the peer-provided ID count to reserve memory before checking whether the message contains the corresponding IDs: ```rust let mut their_elems: HashSet<Id> = HashSet::with_capacity(num_ids as usize); ``` An attacker can declare an arbitrarily large count without supplying any IDs. The allocation occurs before the parser reaches the ID-reading loop, which would otherwise reject the truncated message. With Rust's default allocation-error behavior, a failed allocation aborts the process rather than unwinding. Consequently, `catch_unwind` cannot contain the failure. Both `reconcile` and `reconcile_with_ids` reach the vulnerable parser. The patched versions validate the count against the remaining message length before allocating: ```rust if num_ids > (query.len() / ID_SIZE) as u64 { return Err(Error::ParseEndsPrematurely); } ``` ## Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can terminate an application that exposes reconciliation to untrusted peers without additional validation. For example, a Nostr relay that forwards `NEG-OPEN` or `NEG-MSG` reconciliation payloads to the vulnerable parser can be taken down by a single client message. Clients processing messages from malicious relays are also exposed. This specific vulnerability affects builds with the default `std` feature enabled. Builds without `std` use a `BTreeSet` and do not perform the vulnerable preallocation. A message-size limit alone does not prevent exploitation because the malicious payload can be only a few bytes long. ## Credit Discovered and fixed by **Alex Gleason** (<https://github.com/alexgleason>).
- Published
- Oct 14, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 16, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | negentropy | from 0.2.0 · before 0.4.4 | 0.4.4 |
| crates.io | negentropy | from 0.5.0 · before 0.5.2 | 0.5.2 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:negentropy | 0.4.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
| crates.io:negentropy | 0.5.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recorded+8 d
- TodayNov 16, 2026+33 d
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
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CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.