RUSTSEC-2026-0275: Legacy `azure_core` writes the `authorization` header value to logs
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: azure_core (crates.io) 0.2.0, 0.22.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to azure_core (crates.io) 0.2.0, 0.22.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
Applications built on the legacy Azure SDK for Rust (`azure_core` 0.21.0 and earlier) write the value of the outgoing `authorization` header to their logs whenever debug-level logging is enabled, and in every affected version also at trace level. The leaked values are live credentials — Microsoft Entra ID bearer tokens, Azure Storage SharedKey signatures, and SAS tokens — and anyone with read access to the logs can replay them until they expire (CWE-532). Versions 0.22.0 and later, which are the rewritten and currently supported SDK, do not contain the affected code. ## Affected versions Every published legacy version except 0.2.0 writes the `authorization` header value to logs: 0.1.1 (2022-01-25), and 0.2.1 through 0.21.0 (2024-10-15). ## Mitigation - Upgrade to `azure_core` 1.0.0 or newer. - If you are unable to upgrade, raise the log level above debug for the impacted crates or submit a feature request for missing crates built on `azure_core` 1.0.0 or newer. - Treat logs produced by an affected build as credential-bearing: rotate any long-lived secret that authenticated a request while debug logging was on. ## Coordination The finding was reported to the Microsoft Security Response Center (VULN-211331), which determined that it does not meet the Microsoft Security Servicing Criteria definition of a security vulnerability. It was then disclosed publicly as [Azure/azure-sdk-for-rust#5074][issue] on 2026-08-15, asking the maintainers to confirm the behavior so that an advisory could be filed for the legacy crates. A maintainer replied on 2026-08-26 and closed the issue as not planned: the `legacy` branch is unsupported, there are no plans to update it, and users should move to crates built on `azure_core` 1.0.0 or newer. [pr]: https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-rust/pull/1699 [issue]: https://github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-rust/issues/5074
- Published
- Aug 15, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 1, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | azure_core | pkg:cargo/azure_core |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | azure_core | from 0.0.0-0 · before 0.2.0 | 0.2.0 |
| crates.io | azure_core | from 0.2.1-0 · before 0.22.0 | 0.22.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:azure_core | 0.2.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
| crates.io:azure_core | 0.22.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.