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OSV ecosystem advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0199: Panic in `bcrypt::verify` on non-ASCII hash input

MediumCVSS 5.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: bcrypt (crates.io) 0.19.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to bcrypt (crates.io) 0.19.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

`bcrypt::verify(password, hash)` and `HashParts::from_str(hash)` panic in `str::slice_error_fail` when given a 60-byte `&str` containing a multi-byte UTF-8 character at certain byte positions. ## Impact Any Rust code that calls `bcrypt::verify` (or `HashParts::from_str`) with an attacker-controlled hash string will panic. The `bcrypt` crate is `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`, so this is limited to a denial-of-service and cannot lead to memory corruption. Realistic attack contexts include: - Rust authentication services reading hashes from a database that was previously compromised via, e.g., SQL injection. The attacker can then crash the service on every login attempt against the tampered account. - CLI tools accepting hashes from stdin or command-line arguments. - Password managers or vault services loading hashes from untrusted configuration sources. ## Root cause `split_hash` performed five `&str` slicing operations on the input hash: `&hash[1..3]`, `&hash[4..6]`, `&hash[7..]`, `&salt_and_hash[..22]`, and `&salt_and_hash[22..]`. None of these were char-boundary-checked. Any input where a multi-byte UTF-8 character spanned one of those byte positions caused a panic. This is a regression of the fix originally shipped in 2021 for issue #62 (commit `0833509`). The regression was introduced in the parser rewrite in PR #95 (commit `e9a8394`, released as 0.19.0). The pre-existing regression test `does_no_error_on_char_boundary_splitting` was not removed, but was silently rendered ineffective by the new `bytes[0] != b'$'` guard, which rejected its input earlier and prevented it from reaching the buggy slices — leaving CI green through the regression. ## Fix `split_hash` now rejects any hash string containing non-ASCII bytes up front. A valid bcrypt hash is always exactly 60 ASCII bytes, so this closes the entire class of byte-boundary panics rather than guarding each slice individually. The fix was merged in PR #103 and released as `bcrypt 0.19.2` on 2026-06-20. ## Downstream impact `pyca/bcrypt` (which depended on `bcrypt 0.19.1`) is **not** affected. Its Python-side wrapper performs its own byte-level salt parsing before invoking `bcrypt::hash_with_salt`, and never reaches the buggy code path in `split_hash` or `verify`.

Published
Jun 20, 2026
Updated
Jul 4, 2026
EPSS
—
CWE
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

21

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
crates.iobcrypt

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.iobcryptfrom 0.19.0 · before 0.19.20.19.2

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:bcrypt0.19.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
Low

Weakness class (CWE)

—

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

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