GHSA-xrv8-2pf5-f3q7: nitro-tpm-pcr-compute may allow kernel command line modification by an account operator
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 24/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: nitro-tpm-pcr-compute (crates.io) 1.1.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to nitro-tpm-pcr-compute (crates.io) 1.1.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary Adding default PCR12 validation to ensure that account operators can not modify kernel command line parameters, potentially bypassing root filesystem integrity validation. Attestable AMIs are based on the systemd Unified Kernel Image (UKI) concept which uses systemd-boot to create a single measured UEFI binary from a Linux kernel, its initramfs, and kernel command line. The embedded kernel command line contains a dm-verity hash value that establishes trust in the root file system. When UEFI Secure Boot is disabled, systemd-boot appends any command line it receives to the kernel command line. Account operators with the ability to modify UefiData can install a boot variable with a command line that deactivates root file system integrity validation, while preserving the original PCR4 value. Systemd-boot provides separate measurement of command line modifications in PCR12. ## Impact In line with the TPM 2.0 specification and systemd-stub logic, KMS policies that do not include validation for PCR12 (command line measurement) or PCR7 (enabled Secure Boot) may allow kernel command line modification by an account operator. ## Patches Version 1.1.0 of nitro-tpm-pcr-compute has been updated to include PCR12 with a static zero value. The updated tool now outputs PCR12 in the JSON measurements: ```json { "Measurements": { "HashAlgorithm": "SHA384", "PCR4": "<hex string>", "PCR7": "<hex string>", "PCR12": "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" } } ``` ## Workarounds For users who cannot upgrade to version 1.1.0 of nitro-tpm-pcr-compute immediately, the following workarounds are available: 1. **Manually add PCR12 to KMS policies:** Add PCR12 with a static zero value to your AWS KMS key policies: ```txt kms:RecipientAttestation:NitroTPMPCR12:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ``` 2. **Enable and validate UEFI Secure Boot:** Configure your Attestable AMI to use UEFI Secure Boot and validate its enablement via PCR7 in your KMS policy. When UEFI Secure Boot is active, the command line cannot be overwritten.
- Published
- Dec 5, 2025
- Updated
- Dec 5, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-77
Report tools
Action score
24
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 24 / 40 · 6.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | nitro-tpm-pcr-compute | pkg:cargo/nitro-tpm-pcr-compute |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | nitro-tpm-pcr-compute | before 1.1.0 | 1.1.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:nitro-tpm-pcr-compute | 1.1.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-77 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- LDAP InjectionCAPEC-136likelihood: High · High
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- IMAP/SMTP Command InjectionCAPEC-183Medium
- Command InjectionCAPEC-248likelihood: Medium · High
- Manipulating Writeable Terminal DevicesCAPEC-40likelihood: High · Very High
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Manipulating Writeable Configuration FilesCAPEC-75likelihood: High · Very High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (7 more)Show less
- docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/attestable-ami.html
- docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/uefi-secure-boot.html
- github.com/aws/NitroTPM-Tools
- github.com/aws/NitroTPM-Tools/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
- github.com/aws/NitroTPM-Tools/releases/tag/v1.1.0
- github.com/aws/nitrotpm-attestation-samples
- www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd-stub.html
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.