Skip to content
Noroxi
OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-xq78-wvcv-hqvj: MIKEY message MAC is never verified on receive, so forged messages are accepted

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: mykey (crates.io) 2.0.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to mykey (crates.io) 2.0.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

`mykey` implements MIKEY (RFC 3830) for SRTP key exchange. No receive path verified the MIKEY message authentication code. `crypto::verify_mac` existed and was correct, but it was called only from unit tests — neither `MikeyMessage::from_bytes` nor `MikeyMessage::complete_psk` invoked it. `new_psk_init` computed an HMAC-SHA-1-160 over the serialized message and appended it, so the tag was present on the wire and looked like integrity protection. It was decorative: a receiver accepted any message regardless of whether the MAC was correct, wrong, or absent. ## Consequences - An attacker able to inject or modify MIKEY messages in transit faced no integrity check. Modified RAND, SSRC or security-policy payloads were accepted silently. Note that this does not require a man-in-the-middle position: since nothing was checked, a wholly forged PSK-Init was accepted. - Pre-shared key mode therefore provided no mutual authentication, despite the documentation claiming that it did. Possession of the pre-shared key was never actually proven by either party. - Replayed init messages were not rejected. The practical severity was bounded by GHSA-fwjg-cm92-j3hj (cleartext TGK), which already let a passive observer recover the key material outright without needing to forge anything. ## The fix `complete_psk` now verifies the message MAC **before** any decryption, so a message that fails authentication yields no key material at all. A `MacAlg::Null` payload, an absent MAC and a truncated MAC are each refused rather than treated as "no check required". The authentication key is now derived from the pre-shared key per RFC 3830 §4.1.4 rather than from the TGK — a prerequisite, since verifying against a TGK-derived key would have been circular while the TGK travelled in the message itself. Optional §6.9 verification messages were also added, giving the exchange genuine mutual authentication. Replay protection is still absent: a captured PSK-Init can be replayed and will be accepted, because the optional COUNTER timestamp is emitted rather than a mandatory NTP type and no record of seen timestamps or RAND values is kept. That gap is tracked at <https://github.com/waxspin/mykey/issues/24> and is not covered by this advisory. ## Workarounds Treat parsed MIKEY messages as unauthenticated input: do not rely on pre-shared key mode for peer authentication or message integrity, and carry it over a transport that provides both.

Published
Oct 9, 2026
Updated
Oct 12, 2026
EPSS
—
CWE
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow GHSA-xq78-wvcv-hqvj

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

One daily email digest (06:00 UTC); connect a webhook for KEV listings and weaponized exploits every 10 minutes on paid plans, on the hour on the free plan.

Your free account also gets you

  • CVE alerts: add the products and versions you run, get the new CVEs that affect them
  • Uptime monitoring: 1 site, instant email when it goes down
  • Add your domain: subdomains and takeover risk scanned every week (1 domain)
  • 10 scans an hour on the security tools, at most 30 a day (3 a day without an account), an API key and MCP
  • All your scans in one panel: findings, what changed in the last scan, a report per domain or per client (PDF, share link)
All free tools

Sign up with email · Have an account? Sign in

Free account, no card. Unfollow any time.

Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

We use this product, ask for help

Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

—

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.iomykeyfrom 0.0.0-0 · before 2.0.02.0.0

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:mykey2.0.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recorded+13 d
  3. TodayNov 17, 2026+39 d

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

Weakness class (CWE)

—

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records