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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-xfqj-r5qw-8g4j: Paperclip: Unauthenticated Access to Multiple API Endpoints in Authenticated Mode

HighCVSS 8.3 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 33/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @paperclipai/server (npm) 2026.416.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @paperclipai/server (npm) 2026.416.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary Several API endpoints in `authenticated` mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed. Verified against the latest version. Discord: sagi03581 ## Steps to Reproduce ### 1. Unauthenticated issue data access `GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` returns issue data for a heartbeat run with zero authentication. Every other endpoint in `server/src/routes/activity.ts` calls `assertCompanyAccess`, but this one was missed. ```bash curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/heartbeat-runs/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/issues # -> [] (HTTP 200, not 401 or 403) ``` If an attacker obtains a valid run UUID (from logs, error messages, shared URLs, or by probing), they can read issue data without any credentials. ### 2. Unauthenticated CLI auth challenge creation `POST /api/cli-auth/challenges` creates a CLI authentication challenge with no actor check at all. The handler at `server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659` skips any auth verification. ```bash curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"command":"test"}' \ http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges # returns challenge ID, token, and a pre-generated board API key ``` The response includes a `boardApiToken` that becomes active once the challenge is approved. Combined with open registration (separate report), this enables persistent API key generation. ### 3. Unauthenticated agent instruction / system prompt leakage These endpoints in `server/src/routes/access.ts` require no authentication: ```bash curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/index # returns all available skill endpoints curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip # returns the FULL agent heartbeat procedure including: # - every API endpoint and its parameters # - authentication mechanism (env var names, header formats) # - the complete agent coordination protocol # - the agent creation/hiring workflow curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip-create-agent # returns the full agent creation workflow with adapter configs ``` This hands an attacker a complete map of the internal API without authenticating. It also leaks how agents authenticate, how heartbeats work, and what adapter configurations are available. ### 4. Unauthenticated deployment configuration disclosure `GET /api/health` returns deployment mode, exposure setting, auth status, bootstrap status, version, and feature flags. ```bash curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/health # { # "deploymentMode": "authenticated", # "deploymentExposure": "public", # "authReady": true, # "bootstrapStatus": "ready", # "version": "2026.403.0", # ... # } ``` Tells an attacker exactly how the instance is configured, whether registration is available, and what version is running. ## Impact - **Data exposure**: heartbeat run issues accessible without credentials. Agent instructions and full API structure exposed to anyone. - **Reconnaissance**: an attacker can fingerprint the deployment (mode, version, features) and map the entire internal API before attempting anything else. - **Auth bypass stepping stone**: unauthenticated CLI challenge creation is a building block for the full RCE chain (reported separately). ## Suggested Fixes 1. **Add authentication to heartbeat run issues** in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`: - `GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` -- add `assertCompanyAccess` like every other endpoint in the same file 2. **Add authentication to CLI challenge creation** in `server/src/routes/access.ts`: - `POST /api/cli-auth/challenges` -- add `assertBoard` at minimum 3. **Add authentication to skill endpoints** in `server/src/routes/access.ts`: - `GET /api/skills/available` - `GET /api/skills/index` - `GET /api/skills/:skillName` 4. **Reduce health endpoint information** -- consider removing `deploymentMode`, `deploymentExposure`, and `version` from the unauthenticated response, or gating the full response behind `assertBoard` 5. Consider a **global auth rejection middleware** for all `/api/*` routes in `authenticated` mode. Currently unauthenticated requests get `actor: { type: "none" }` and pass through to `next()`, relying on each route handler to check individually. A missing check means an open endpoint. Rejecting `type: "none"` at the middleware level for all routes except an explicit public allowlist (health, sign-in, sign-up, webhooks) would prevent this class of bug entirely. ## Contact Discord: sagi03581 Happy to help verify fixes or provide additional details.

Published
Apr 16, 2026
Updated
Apr 16, 2026
EPSS
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

33

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
33 / 40 · 8.3 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
npm@paperclipai/server

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@paperclipai/serverbefore 2026.416.02026.416.0

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-3xx2-mqjm-hg9xPaperclip: Cross-tenant agent API key IDOR in `/agents/:id/keys` routes allows full victim-company compromise
    39Monitor
  • GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmpPaperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys
    39Monitor
  • GHSA-w8hx-hqjv-vjcqPaperclip: Malicious skills able to exfiltrate and destroy all user data
    29Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • Later →GHSA-p7mm-r948-4q3qApr 16, 2026 · Paperclip: Approval decision attribution spoofing via client-controlled `decidedByUserId` in paperclip server
    17Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@paperclipai/server2026.416.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

  • GHSA-w8hx-hqjv-vjcq0 days apartPaperclip: Malicious skills able to exfiltrate and destroy all user data
    29Monitor

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

osv

Root cause

A function added for development or support ships to production without authentication. It often relies on the assumption that it is “only reachable from the internal network.”

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
// Added for the support teamapp.post("/maintenance/reset", resetDevice);

Fixed

ts
if (config.maintenanceEnabled) {  app.post(    "/maintenance/reset",    requireSession, requireRole("admin"), resetDevice  );}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records