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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47: skillctl: Path traversal and symlink-follow in skillctl allow arbitrary file disclosure and deletion

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: skillctl (crates.io) 0.1.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to skillctl (crates.io) 0.1.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Impact `skillctl` 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 contained four path-safety vulnerabilities that, in combination, allowed an attacker to: 1. **Exfiltrate arbitrary files on the operator's machine** by publishing a malicious skills library containing a symlink inside a skill folder (e.g. `niania → /home/user/.aws/credentials`). The symlink fell through `entry.file_type().is_dir()` in `fs_util::copy_dir_all`, was dereferenced by `fs::copy`, and the target's content was copied into the project. A subsequent `skillctl push` would have published the secret to the (possibly public) library — what the reporter called "round-trip path exfiltration". 2. **Delete arbitrary directories outside the project or library root** by crafting a `.skills.toml` with a malicious `destination` or `source_path` field. Both were deserialized as `PathBuf` with zero validation. Because `Path::join` lets an absolute right-hand side replace the base, `destination = "/home/user/.ssh"` made `cwd.join(...)` resolve outside the project; `..` traversal was equally unguarded. Downstream `remove_dir_all` in `replace_folder_contents` then wiped arbitrary writable directories on `skillctl pull` / `push` / `detect`. `.skills.toml` is the exact kind of file teams commit and exchange via PR; a single merged malicious PR was sufficient to weaponise the maintainer's next `skillctl pull --all`. 3. **`detect --target` accepted `..` traversal**, even though absolute paths were rejected. `--target ../../../etc` would have written outside the library root. 4. **Fork-name validation accepted `.` and `..` literally**, so a fork named `..` would have produced a `Path::join` resolving to the parent directory and `fs::rename` could have clobbered it. ## Patches Fixed in [v0.1.2](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.2): - Symlinks inside skill folders are hard-rejected at copy time (both top-level source and any descendant entry). - `.skills.toml` `destination` and `source_path` are validated at load time and reject absolute paths, `..` components, and Windows-prefix components. - A new `path_safety::safe_join` helper is wired (defense-in-depth) at every destructive call site in `pull.rs` / `push.rs`. - `detect --target` and the interactive custom-path prompt go through the same `validate_relative_subpath` helper. - `validate_fork_name` explicitly rejects `.` and `..`. Threat-model note: the fix is purely lexical (component-level) plus an explicit symlink check at copy time. No filesystem `canonicalize` calls were added, avoiding TOCTOU windows. ## Credit Reported privately on 2026-05-19 by **firebaguette** via the Umanio Discord (the reporter declined GitHub credit, so this advisory carries no structured credits field).

Published
Jun 5, 2026
Updated
Jun 19, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
crates.ioskillctl

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.ioskillctlbefore 0.1.20.1.2

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-74p7-6h78-gw8pskillctl: argument injection, path traversal in --dest, FIFO/device DoS, hardlink exfiltration, and commit-trailer forgery
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:skillctl0.1.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • GHSA-74p7-6h78-gw8p17 days apartskillctl: argument injection, path traversal in --dest, FIFO/device DoS, hardlink exfiltration, and commit-trailer forgery
    0Monitor

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
P

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

References

All records