GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh: neotoma has tenant isolation gap in relationship query endpoints
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: neotoma (npm) 0.14.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to neotoma (npm) 0.14.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The `/list_relationships` and `/retrieve_graph_neighborhood` endpoints call `getAuthenticatedUserId` (confirming a valid session exists) but do not pass the resolved user ID into the Supabase query as an `.eq("user_id", userId)` filter. As a result, queries return rows from all users rather than scoping to the authenticated caller's data. ## Affected code **`/list_relationships`** (`src/actions.ts`): - Calls `getAuthenticatedUserId` but does not apply `.eq("user_id", userId)` to the relationships query - Uses `.or()` string interpolation for entity ID matching without input validation **`/retrieve_graph_neighborhood`** (`src/actions.ts`): - Same pattern: auth resolved, user ID not applied to query filter ## Affected versions v0.13.0 ## Prerequisites 1. A valid authentication token for the Neotoma instance (attacker must have a legitimate account on the same instance) 2. A known entity ID belonging to another user (~96 bits of entropy — brute-force not practical) An unauthenticated caller is rejected at the auth middleware layer. The gap requires a second user account on the instance. ## Impact An authenticated user with a known cross-user entity ID can retrieve relationship edges and graph neighborhood data belonging to another user. No write capability is exposed. ## Severity Low under current conditions — no multi-tenant deployments exist. Escalates to Medium the moment two or more user accounts share an instance. ## Remediation 1. Add `.eq("user_id", userId)` to all Supabase queries in both handlers 2. Validate entity ID inputs with `isNeotomaEntityId` before query construction 3. Replace `.or()` string interpolation with separate scoped `.eq()` calls Fix tracked in #365 (list_relationships) and #366 (retrieve_graph_neighborhood). Gate gap tracked in #372.
- Published
- Jun 25, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-201
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | neotoma | pkg:npm/neotoma |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | neotoma | from 0.13.0 · before 0.14.0 | 0.14.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:neotoma | 0.14.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-201 · Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent DataCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Choosing Message IdentifierCAPEC-12likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL/TLSCAPEC-217likelihood: Low
- WiFi MAC Address TrackingCAPEC-612Low
- WiFi SSID TrackingCAPEC-613Low
- Cellular Broadcast Message RequestCAPEC-618Low
- Signal Strength TrackingCAPEC-619Low
- Analysis of Packet Timing and SizesCAPEC-621Low
- Electromagnetic Side-Channel AttackCAPEC-622Low
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.