GHSA-wr2m-38xh-rpc9: Lemmy user purging users or communities or banning users can delete images they didn't upload/exclusively use
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: lemmy_server (crates.io) 0.19.11.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to lemmy_server (crates.io) 0.19.11 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary An improper uploaded media ownership check can result in inadvertent deletion of media when a user is banned with content removal or purged. This can lead to deletion of media that was not uploaded by the banned/purged user. This also applies to purged communities, in which case all media posted in that community will get deleted without proper ownership check. This is limited to media with an `image/*` content-type returned by pict-rs. ### Details Lemmy did not associate users with media uploads until version 0.19.0 ([#3927](https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/pull/3927)). Back when the first parts of content purging were implemented for 0.17.0 ([#1809](https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy/pull/1809)), it was therefore not possible to properly identify media belonging to a specific user for situations in which this data should get erased from pict-rs, Lemmy's media storage backend. Pict-rs deduplicates uploaded files transparently. As a result, it has two types of media deletion. A regular deletion will only remove the referenced alias, and if there are not other aliases pointing to the same file, the backing file will also be deleted. A purge on the other hand will delete all aliases pointing to the specified file, as well as the file itself. The logic implemented in 0.17.0 iterated over media URLs related to users and communities when purging them and purged them from pict-rs. This results in a full deletion of the backing media, even if either the same URL was the result of an upload by a different user, or the same media being uploaded by another user with a different alias. For user purges, Lemmy iterated over all posts they created and applied this to all media referenced in post URLs and post thumbnails. For community purges, this applied to all posts within this community. Additionally, the deletion of user avatars, banners, as well as the media from all their posts was implemented when users were banned with content removal. This includes local bans and also bans received via federation, when a user gets banned on their home instance. The function for purging images from pict-rs performs a check at the start to verify that the media `Content-Type` header returned by pict-rs starts with `image/`, which limits this to not affect other media types supported by Lemmy and pict-rs, such as videos. ### Impact #### Instances with open federation The vast majority of Lemmy instances has open federation, which means that this can be exploited remotely without any authentication. #### Instances with limited or no federation Exploitation requires user interaction by an admin of the targeted instance or a federation-linked instance if federation is enabled. It may also require authentication, as instances may not have open registrations.
- Published
- Apr 8, 2025
- Updated
- Apr 8, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-708
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | lemmy_server | pkg:cargo/lemmy_server |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | lemmy_server | from 0.17.0 · before 0.19.11 | 0.19.11 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:lemmy_server | 0.19.11 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-708 · Incorrect Ownership AssignmentCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.